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Runaway costs, management flaws, and communication failures in the ad hoc tribunals in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have generated fatal donor fatigue1 and called into question 
the efficacy of international criminal justice. It is unlikely that an ad hoc tribunal will be created 
again. So where do we go from here? What will fill the void in the field of post-atrocity justice? 
Freelance prosecutions like the Pinochet prosecution by Spanish Judge Garzon remain a 
peripheral phenomenon despite their vital contributions. Domestic judiciaries in post-atrocity 
states are often devastated, and sometimes corrupt and illegitimate. However, dwelling on 
condemnations of ad hocs or national courts soon becomes unproductive.  We must find cost-
efficient, high-impact alternatives to international ad hoc criminal courts. Hybrid mechanisms 
that blend international and domestic laws, structures, and personnel promise to deliver justice 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity in post-atrocity states, especially where they are able 
to foster local justice reform. 
The ICC is often touted as the alternative to international ad hocs, but it only provides a 
partial solution. A patchwork of hybrids would be a vital complement to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). First, many past conflicts, as well as present conflicts in non-signatory 
nations, lie beyond the jurisdiction of the ICC. Second, even when the ICC has jurisdiction over 
a set of crimes, it will never be able to try more than a handful of senior figures involved in any 
conflict. Third, the ICC’s binary approach of either providing wholly international justice or 
                                                 
1 The recent Report of the Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616* (Aug. 23, 2004) (‘The rule of law report’) summarizes these costs: “The two ad 
hoc tribunals have grown into large institutions, with more than 2,000 posts between them and a combined annual 
budget exceeding a quarter of a billion dollars – equivalent to more than 15 per cent of the Organization’s total 
regular budget. Although trying complex legal cases of this nature would be expensive for any legal system and the 
tribunals’ impact and performance cannot be measured in financial numbers alone, the stark differential between 
cost and number of cases processed does raise important questions.” (At para. 42.) 
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leaving the conflict to local post-atrocity courts limits its ambitions to provide genuine 
accountability.  Wholly local courts are frequently corrupt and politicized; while wholly 
international courts have proven disconnected with local realities and even considered 
imperialist.  The ICC’s binary view ought to be broadened to consider the possibility of a third, 
hybrid option. Hybrids are compatible with the ICC, and their development should be read into 
the Rome Statute.  
This paper explores the structural and theoretical advantages and disadvantages of hybrid 
courts, existing hybrids, and outlines international ad hocs’ flaws that hybrids can remedy. In 
theory at least, hybrids can draw upon the strengths of international justice and the benefits of 
local prosecutions. On one hand, hybrids can harness the credibility of international law and the 
legitimacy particular to international institutions, whose participation can lend hybrid courts a 
degree of authority as a fair mechanism for holding perpetrators accountable. On the other hand, 
hybrids can be structured to tap into local expertise, connect with local populations, and rebuild 
local judicial systems as a training ground for rule of law values.  They also avoid the staggering 
costs of purely international courts. By integrating local norms, hybrid courts can bring culturally 
adapted justice to the people that international courts purport to serve but cannot reach; they can 
bridge the divide between remote, wealthy international jurists and third world victims of war 
crimes. If they are embedded into local justice systems, and their mandates are broadened to 
focus on local justice reform/rebuilding, hybrids have the potential to anchor justice mechanisms 
into local culture, genuinely altering cycles of impunity by changing local judicial institutions in 
a sustainable way. The hybrid model can thus move beyond retributive justice and foster a 
culture of accountability.  
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This paper is divided into six sections. The first sketches a definition of hybrid courts. 
The second delineates how hybrids can respond to an imperative for local empowerment and the 
need to transform local judicial culture in post-atrocity situations. The third briefly describes 
extant hybrids, evaluating successes and failures. The fourth discusses flaws inherent to the 
hybrid model as such. The fifth examines ad hoc tribunals’ flaws which hybrids could potentially 
solve. Sixth, the paper explores the possibility of symbiotic juxtaposition of hybrids and the ICC. 
This paper does not necessarily endorse existing hybrid tribunals.  Rather, it is the model 
of hybrid tribunals which is presented as a promising model; an alternative theoretical 
framework to strictly international or strictly national tribunals. This paper endeavors to push 
forward the dialogue about how to better structure such courts in order to impact the populations 
hybrids purport to serve. Despite the burgeoning literature on transitional justice, semi-
internationalized or hybrid courts have received far less attention than ad hoc tribunals such as 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC).2 Without sufficient 
analysis of their structures, strengths and weaknesses, hybrids courts will remain flawed, 
makeshift configurations, highly vulnerable to avoidable failures. 
1. INTRODUCTION TO HYBRID COURTS  
During the late 1990s and 2000s, a “third-generation” of international criminal tribunals 
emerged, drawing on the heritage of the first generation tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and 
 
2 The limited scholarly interest in hybrids can be largely attributed to their newness. However, some very impressive 
scholars have made critical contributions and their work deserves recognition. First and foremost, Laura Dickinson 
has begun addressing the promise of hybrid courts within an overarching theoretical framework, in numerous 
articles. Moreover, a few pioneering scholars such as Abdul Tejan Cole and Suzanne Katzenstein have written 
insightful, comprehensive articles on specific hybrids. This number is dwarfed by the plethora of law journal articles 
on the International Criminal Court (over 2000 found in searches on Westlaw and Lexis) and the numerous articles 
directly concentrated on the ad-hoc tribunals (over 600 found in searches on Westlaw and Lexis). A large number of 
law journal articles cursorily touch upon to hybrids, but without enough deliberation to be mentioned here.  
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the second generation of ad hoc tribunals with the ICTY and ICTR. These third generation courts 
have been called “hybrid” criminal bodies. Blending the international and the local, existing 
hybrids are products of judicial accountability-sharing between the states in which they function 
and the United Nations. 
The structure of the handful of existing hybrid tribunals does not by any means set in 
stone the limits for all conceivable forms of hybrids. However, without endorsing particular 
existing hybrid courts, or using them to limit the hybrid model to a particular framework, 
examining them can improve our understanding of the hybrid model’s possibilities and 
limitations.  
Currently, the term “hybrid” is used to indicate three jurisdictions created between 1999 
and 2001 in East Timor (the Serious Crimes Panels of the District Court of Dili),3 Kosovo 
(“Regulation 64” Panels in the Courts of Kosovo)4 and Sierra Leone (the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone).5 A fourth hybrid Court to address crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia 
(the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia),6 has been negotiated between the UN 
 
3 See On the Organization of Courts in East Timor, United Nations Transnational Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) Reg. 2000/11, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (Mar. 6, 2000).  For more information on the East 
Timor hybrid, see the Judicial System Monitoring Programme website at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/ (one of the 
most comprehensive on the matter, containing in one place all basic materials about East Timor Serious Crimes 
panels, as well as current news about the trials, including those in Indonesia); and http://www.pict-
pcti.org/courts/eastimor_basic_doc.html  
4 See On the Appointment and Removal from Office of International Judges and International Prosecutors, United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Regulation 2000/6, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/6 
(Jan. 12, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg06.html.  For more information 
on the Kosovo hybrid, see the Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) authorizing UNMIK at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/courts/pdf/kosovo/Re1999_1.htm  
5 For information on the Sierra Leone hybrid, see the Special Court for Sierra Leone homepage at http://www.sc-
sl.org/; or the very informative site developed by the NGO No Peace Without Justice at http://www.specialcourt.org/  
6 For information on the Extraordinary Chambers, see the website of the Task Force for Cooperation with Foreign 
Legal Experts for the Preparation of the Proceedings for the Trial of Senior Khmer Rouge Leaders at 
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/, and the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea at 
http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/pdf/Cambodia/Cambodia_052203.pdf. See also His Excellency Sok An, Presentation 
and Comments to the National Assembly on the Draft Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (Dec. 
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and the Cambodian government, and ratified by the Cambodian National Assembly.7 The Iraq 
Special Tribunal might come to be described as a hybrid although its future remains uncertain, 
and the international side of the IST has thus far been restricted primarily to American rather 
than multi-national involvement.8
Hybrid courts have emerged in post-conflict situations when insufficient local capacity 
existed to deal with mass atrocity, 9 reflecting the reality that fully functioning national courts 
whose overall credibility cannot be impugned mitigate the need for outside help.10 However, 
international tribunals do not render hybrids superfluous. Although the East Timor and Sierra 
Leone hybrids arose in the absence of any international justice mechanism, the Kosovo hybrid 
complemented the ICTY which could not cope with the sheer number of cases.  
The UN has assumed responsibility for helping hybrid courts obtain funding, resources, 
judges, and prosecutors through “voluntary” contributions from other national donors.11 Where 
the Security Council dominated the ICTY and ICTR, the Office of Legal Affairs has handled 
Cambodia and the respective SRSGs have had control in Kosovo and East Timor. However, in 
 
29, 2000 & Jan. 2, 2001) (outlining the details of the law and describing it as consisting of “new formulas, new 
concepts, and new and significant principles”), available at http://www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government60.htm.   
7 Opposition parties in Cambodia (royalist Funcinpec and opposition Sam Rainsy Party) boycotted Parliament for a 
year, with the inevitable effect that no legislation could be passed, and no treaties ratified.   
8 National Public Radio All Things Considered, Debate over whether the Iraqi Special Tribunal could deliver fair 
verdicts in the upcoming trials of former members of Saddam Hussein's regime, interviewing Tom Parker: 
“Although the British government tried to persuade the Iraqis that the death penalty will make life very difficult for 
them; it will make it almost impossible for the international community--certainly for the European Union and for 
NGOs--to assist them, the Iraqis insisted on going forward with it.” 
9 While it is critical for international jurists not to denigrate local courts overall, it is undeniable that following mass 
atrocity, local judiciaries are often devastated. See e.g. Hansjörg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interventions 
Work: The U.N. And The Creation Of Transitional Justice Systems In Kosovo And East Timor, 25-SUM Fletcher F. 
World Aff. 107: “The exodus from Kosovo and East Timor of virtually all lawyers, judges, and prosecutors who had 
previously served in the judiciary, as well as of many law clerks and secretaries, left a huge void in experienced 
legal personnel. In fact, under Indonesian rule, no East Timorese lawyers had been appointed to judicial or 
prosecutorial office. As a result, there were no jurists in East Timor with any relevant experience in the 
administration of justice or the practical application of law. The situation in Kosovo was comparable.” 
10 For instance, no one has ever proposed an international tribunal for French trials of WWII-era war criminals. 
11 For an impressive overview of the range and variation in UN involvement in international(ized) tribunals, see 
Philippa Webb, Six Degrees of Separation: Relationships between the United Nations and Internationalized Courts 
and Tribunals, Spring 2004 (unpublished paper, on file with author) 
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hybrid courts, national governments can also undertake part of the costs, provide various 
resources, and appoint some of the judges, prosecutors, personnel (as was the case in Sierra 
Leone and as is planned in Cambodia).  
While the UN established and managed hybrids in Kosovo and East Timor independently 
of decisions by local governments, the Sierra Leonean and Cambodian hybrid structures resulted 
from negotiations between the United Nations and the sovereign state concerned. It remains to be 
seen if the term “hybrid” will become a catch-all for any institution between an international 
tribunal and national court, or if it will crystallize at a point along that spectrum. A hybrid court 
could theoretically be even more separate from the UN – it could be established with several 
states acting in concert and without any UN involvement at all. According to this definition, the 
Iraq Special Tribunal would be a hybrid in spite of the absence of non-American advisors to the 
IST. Alternatively, although the Security Council has not yet created any hybrids, it might be 
possible for the Security Council to do so independently of national authorities in failed states.  
Given the recent nature of the hybrid phenomenon, its precise definition is still evolving. 
Indeed, the definitional challenges reveal a troubling confusion about which blueprints ought to 
be implemented, and point to the dangers of creating institutions without enough serious 
scholarly or practitioner debate on best and worst practices. However, despite ambiguities in 
definitions of hybrid courts, some baseline characteristics emerge. Hybrids blend the 
international and the domestic with legal and organizational innovations that constitute important 
divergences from international ad hoc tribunals. In some cases they coexist with the local 
judiciary, operating in parallel, while in others, they have been grafted onto the local judicial 
system. But in all cases their nature is mixed: composed of international and local staff, they 
apply a compound of international and national substantive and procedural law. Foreign judges 
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sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended by teams of both 
local and foreign lawyers. Occasionally domestic law – reformed to include international 
standards – is applied alongside international law. Ultimately, hybrid criminal bodies form a 
family of their own, apart from other judicial entities. 
2. THE NEED FOR LOCAL EMPOWERMENT AND THE LONG-TERM 
IMPORTANCE OF IMPACTING LOCAL CULTURE 
Before exploring existing hybrids or the international ad hocs they provide an alternative 
to, we must consider their raison d’être, and perhaps even re-conceptualize the theoretical value 
of local input in trying war crimes.  This process entails a philosophical defense of local 
empowerment in post-atrocity justice mechanisms and lays out some of the ways in which the 
hybrid model draws strength from its ability to incorporate and influence local culture. 
2a. A philosophical defense of local empowerment in post-atrocity justice mechanisms: the 
importance of merging local and international elements 
Studying hybrids involves criticizing the notion that the only effective justice is wholly 
international (United Nations-sponsored). This view, so popular within the international human 
rights community, conflates an acknowledgment that local courts are tainted/inadequate with an 
unconditional endorsement of purely international courts. 12
 
12 See Laura A. Dickinson, The ICTY at Ten: a Critical Assessment of the Major Rulings of the International 
Criminal Tribunal Over the Past Decade: The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The 
Case of Kosovo, 37 NEW ENG.L. REV. 1059 (Summer 2003). [hereinafter The Case of Kosovo]: “many of those who 
favor international justice appear to see hybrid tribunals as mere second-best alternatives to international courts…. 
Perhaps one reason for the resistance on this front is the concern that such courts might be supported as an 
alternative to, and perhaps as a means to undermine, international justice.” See, e.g., U.N. Action on Sierra Leone 
Court Welcomed But "Mixed" Tribunal Has Shortcomings, Human Rights Watch (Aug. 14, 2000); Statement by 
France at the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 8, 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 (1993); 
Statement by the United States at the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 12-17, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.3217 (1993). For similar lists of goals, Some attacks on hybrids center on valid concerns, but reasonable 
critiques are frequently overshadowed by more extreme positions that “even when national authorities demonstrate a 
willingness to try perpetrators fairly, international fora more readily fulfill victims' expectations for the ‘highest 
form of justice.’” See Richard Goldstone, The United Nations' War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment, 12 Conn. J. 
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Local courts in most post-conflict contexts are too flawed to cope alone with massive war 
crimes trials, although many domestic prosecutions of international crimes have taken place 
since 1995, especially in more developed countries where decades of peace have permitted some 
rebuilding and reform of local judiciaries.13 In the immediate aftermath of conflict, the inability 
of many post-atrocity local courts to cope with war crimes trials is often due at the most basic 
level to crippling damage sustained by physical infrastructure. In addition, key personnel may 
have fled abroad, been killed, or been compromised by association with a prior regime which 
failed to prosecute or convict murderers, torturers, or ethnic cleansers. In some other cases, a 
new regime may have replaced the old personnel almost completely, resulting in an enormous 
skills and experience deficit, as well as the danger of show trials and overly zealous prosecution 
for past crimes.14  
 
Int’l L. 227, 239 (1997). See also Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and 
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 Eur. J. Int'l L. 2, 7 (1998), at 9. See also Steven R. 
Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law (1997); Theodor 
Meron, Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization?, 9 Eur. J. Int'l L. 18, 31 (1998). According to Jose 
Alvarez, Cassese and Goldstone have been most influential in putting forth this kind of position, and their rationales 
“are repeated, almost as a mantra, by other advocates of modern international war crimes prosecutions.” See Jose E. 
Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 365-70 (1999) 
[hereinafter Crimes of States].   
13 Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Ethiopia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. See Prevent Genocide International, 
http:// www.preventgenocide.org/punish/domestic (last updated Jul. 21, 2003), cited by Mark S. Ellis, Coming To 
Terms With Its Past--Serbia's New Court For The Prosecution of War Crimes, 22 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 165, 
[hereinafter Serbia’s New Court]. 
14 Arguments on the flaws of purely national prosecutions are too numerous to fit within the scope of this paper, and 
many sufficiently self-evident to make a discussion thereof superfluous. The examples of Sierra Leone, East Timor, 
and Rwanda will suffice. Amnesty International’s description of the incapacity of local courts in Sierra Leone is 
representative of responsible observers’ perspective on most post-atrocity local court systems. See e.g. Amnesty 
international, “Collapse of the Sierra Leone Judicial System: Ending impunity - an opportunity not to be missed,” 31 
July 2000, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR510642000?open&of=ENG-SLE: “As a result 
of the conflict, the judicial and legal systems have virtually collapsed and institutions for the administration of 
justice, both civil and criminal, are barely functional.” See also Human Rights Watch, “Sierra Leone: Priorities for 
the International Community, Prosecutions in Sierra Leone” June 20, 2000, 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/06/secmem0620.html. In East Timor, the justice system was completely destroyed 
by retreating Indonesian forces, see Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The 
United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AJIL 46, 50-51 (2001). In Rwanda, “because the Rwandan 
judicial system was in ruins after the 1994 conflict, it did not have the human, physical, or financial resources to deal 
with massive numbers of alleged perpetrators.” Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of 
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However, this does not imply that international courts are the only alternative. Local 
realities may be troubling, murky, and dangerous, but bypassing local input is even more 
problematic than including it. Local culture plays an indispensable part in any long term solution 
to post-atrocity rebuilding. If donor countries or the UN are to succeed in changing a country for 
the better, they “cannot display an elitist, paternalistic attitude” toward local war crimes victims 
and judiciaries, “i.e., viewing local participation as inherently biased, tribal, inexperienced, and 
inept.”15 Doing so jeopardizes the goal of local reform and empowerment, leaving us with the 
alternative of perpetual international oversight – at once unsustainable in practical terms, and 
dubious in moral terms, given its inherent imperialism. 
The importance of having a long-term impact and strengthening local judiciaries 
Any assessment of a war crimes tribunal should focus not only on immediate post-
judgment compliance, but also on the enduring influence of the tribunal on a given country. Even 
a time-limited transitional justice mechanism acquires greater credibility where it is able to 
impact a justice system in the long run. A war crimes tribunal must strive to go beyond 
concocting an exit strategy that allows it to leave a country without any cases pending or staff 
unpaid.   
A war crimes tribunal ought to set an example for the local judiciary, which assumes de 
facto responsibility for whatever high-ranking war criminals the international tribunal could not 
process (ad hocs try only a very limited number of those most responsible for the crimes within 
the court’s jurisdiction, thereby letting most perpetrators, even high-ranking ones, go free). The 
old adage, “Don’t just give people fish – teach them how to fish,” springs to mind. Long-term 
 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass 
Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. Int'l L.J. 163. 
15 See Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and their Ability to Provide Adequate Justice: Lessons from the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 353 [hereinafter Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal]. 
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improvement of the national justice system helps create a culture of justice and accountability 
and ensures that whatever solutions offered by the war crimes tribunal will not vanish when it 
closes shop. Given the time and money expended on post-conflict mechanisms, a failure to 
catalyze meaningful long-term change detracts from their credibility and value. When 
establishing the SCSL, even the UN Security Council recognized the need to adopt a model that 
could leave a strong ‘legacy’ in Sierra Leone, including improved infrastructure, respect for the 
rule of law and trust in public institutions, and improved professional standards, and the SC 
referred specifically to “the pressing need for international cooperation to assist in strengthening 
the judicial system of Sierra Leone…”16
Adjusting to local perceptions of justice: key to fostering rule of law17 and deterrence 
An oft-quoted justification for war crimes tribunals hinges on the concept of creating a 
culture of accountability and fostering the rule of law.18 While success in achieving these goals is 
hard to quantify, it is safe to say that it requires widespread acceptance of certain norms 
(concerning human rights, peaceful conflict resolution, good governance, etc.). By extension, 
having a positive impact on political discourse, popular opinion, and cultural dynamics on the 
ground in post-atrocity states is critical. For such changes to apply, the bulk of the concerned 
population must accept the court or at a minimum, refrain from actively undermining it.  Any 
post-conflict transitional mechanism’s impact on the ground hinges on the institution’s ability to 
effect some change in the hearts and minds of local populations. 
 
16 UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000), Preambular Paragraph 10 (August 14, 2000), cited by James 
Cockayne, The fraying shoestring: rethinking hybrid war crimes tribunals, (unpublished paper, on file with author, 
soon to be published in 28(2) Fordham ILJ (2005)). [hereinafter The fraying shoestring] 
17 For the purposes of this paper, I reject a retributivist position and simply assume that war crimes tribunals ought to 
be structured so as to have a positive impact of the rule of law and a culture of impunity.  
18 For the importance of peace-building as one of the major goals for international criminal bodies, See Payam 
Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 A.J.I.L. 7.; Christina 
M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163.  
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Justice wears many faces and appears in numerous incarnations around the world. It is 
foolish to presume that western norms will be intuitively understood and accepted by everyone 
everywhere. This truism must be underscored, and leads to the unconventional conclusion that 
few international jurists have been willing to contemplate: for post-atrocity justice mechanisms 
to be perceived as effective by non-Western populations, they must be couched in non-Western 
terms that local populations can relate to. They must incorporate elements of local justice and 
culture or at the very least be sensitive to local realities and norms.19 In order for the conviction 
to take root that past wrongdoings have been appropriately dealt with, people must in some small 
measure understand the justice mechanism in place. Ultimately, it is essential to persuade them 
that appropriate punishments have been meted out, and to respect the courts’ decisions.  
The issue here is not to redefine “justice” – but rather to contend that post-atrocity 
populations’ perceptions of justice mechanisms are important. Thus, popular support for and 
understanding of the institution should figure prominently in constructing and assessing hybrid 
and international criminal bodies. Post-conflict transitional criminal bodies must be able to touch 
the people they purport to serve.  
Moreover, war crimes courts ought to deter potential future perpetrators where possible. 
The justification for spending millions of dollars on each conviction lies not only in a belief that 
retributive justice for war crimes is crucial, but also in the hope that vast expenditures will be 
worthwhile if the trial’s symbolic value dissuades future potential perpetrators. For deterrence to 
apply, local military and political powers must understand, and internalize the court’s decisions 
to some extent. In the alternative, they must come to fear the local justice system’s sanctions.  
 
19 A useful parallel to draw here might be the near universal consensus in development philosophy that local 
involvement is critical to sustainable long-term development. Articulated most notably by standard-bearers like the 
prominent Jules Pretty, “participation” has become a buzzword of development practice. For a short list of 
publications by Pretty, see http://www2.essex.ac.uk/ces/CES/JPpage.htm  
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If local elites misunderstand and resent the court as an outside imposition whose 
decisions they passionately object to and believe are illegitimate, they are hardly likely to adapt 
their behavior to its directives. This crisis will become all the more dangerous if the local justice 
and law enforcement systems have not been strengthened enough to contain such elites.  
2b. Hybrids’ potential to incorporate and impact local culture  
Capacity-building  
When juxtaposed with the ad hoc tribunals in terms of their potential to incorporate and 
impact local culture, hybrid courts emerge as an encouraging alternative. They can be structured 
to influence local jurisprudence and national justice systems, and impact the local judiciary in 
ways that international tribunals do not.   
On the most basic level their staffing procedures do a tremendous amount. Because a 
large part of hybrids’ staffs are drawn from pools of local talent, hybrids create an invaluable 
opportunity for the best local litigators and judges to acquire international expertise and to absorb 
fundamental international human rights values. “Hybrid process offers advantages in the arena of 
capacity-building… The side-by-side working arrangements allow for on-the job training that 
may prove more effective than abstract classroom discussions of formal legal rules and 
principles.”20 Without hands-on experience, there is “little opportunity for domestic legal 
professionals to absorb, apply, interpret, critique, and develop the international norms in 
question, let alone for the broader public to do so.”21  
Local staff in hybrids are not the only members of the local judiciary to benefit from their 
experience. Local staff typically maintain much closer personal connections with members of the 
local judiciary than internationals do, simply by virtue of pre-existing collegial friendships and 
 
20 See Dickinson The Case of Kosovo, supra note 12. See also Joel C. Beauvais, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of 
U.N. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1101, 1157-59 (2001).  
21 See Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 A.J.I.L. 295. [hereinafter The Promise of Hybrid Courts] 
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business relationships that arise in any legal community. Even when the local staff of hybrids are 
removed from the local judiciary (e.g. during the hybrids’ tenure),22 they maintain bonds with 
other members of the local judiciary and the broader community. When hybrids close shop, the 
local staff primarily is reabsorbed into the local system, infusing it with the skills and knowledge 
obtained at the hybrid (although there is always a risk of some attrition into the UN system, 
international NGOs, and international litigation). This is critical in light of the dire need for local 
capacity building in most post-conflict situations, and also given that purely domestic and purely 
international institutions rarely promote large-scale local capacity-building. “Even when local 
courts are authorized under domestic law to apply international humanitarian law, there is often 
such a limited base of familiarity with the norms in question that such authority is meaningless. 
In short, the mere existence of an international court does not create a channel for its 
jurisprudence to be used and developed, or even merely respected and understood, on a local 
level.” 23
With this in mind, one must note that just throwing international staff together with locals 
into a building will not provide a magic panacea to the problem of capacity building. “As a 
recent report by the UNDP and the International Center for Transitional Justice entitled The 
“Legacy” of the Special Court for Sierra Leone24 pointed out, a positive legacy is not a self-
fulfilling prophecy, but must be carefully designed and produced.”25 Katzenstein points out in 
 
22 Duration of the tribunal, infusion of local talent to the hybrid tribunal may impose short term costs to the national 
court system, with the best and brightest temporarily drained away from their regular jobs. 
23 See Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, supra note 21. 
24 See the International Center for Transitional Justice and UNDP, The “Legacy” of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (Sept. 29, 2003), available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/LegacyReport.pdf, at 5, 12.  
25 See Cockayne, The fraying shoestring, supra note 16, which summarizes the report as advocating, “three key 
legacy projects, all of which might have positive impacts for rule of law concerns: substantive reform of Sierra 
Leonean law; a strategic professional development program; and raising awareness of the Court as a rule of law 
exemplar. The expected results of these interlocking projects were named as: updated and improved laws; 
availability of skills training and development opportunities for judges, lawyers, investigators, court administrators 
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her article on the East Timor hybrid, that it is a mistake to assume that just by virtue of being 
there, “international judges on the Special Panels can serve as ‘on-site mentors’ to their local 
counterparts... On-site mentors often become distracted by or entirely take over the tasks at hand, 
such as writing opinions, defeating the purpose of the mentoring.” Especially when staff is 
deluged by work, operating under time pressure, and lacking the necessary 
pedagogical/mentoring experience,26 the capacity-building facet of mixed tribunals flounders. 
Disastrous mismanagement can sabotage even the best planned structures.  
While outlining possible capacity-building programs lies beyond the scope of this paper, 
some broad brush-strokes can be suggested to improve blueprints for future hybrids, extending 
their mandates to ensure that hybrids serve as a catalyst for local justice reform. In order to 
strengthen the local judiciary, hybrid courts need to better address actual power dynamics within 
the hybrids themselves, focusing on coequality between local and international staff and 
incorporating training for members of the local judiciary within the mandate of the court. 
Substantive partnership, advisory, and mentoring programs must consistently be reinforced. 
Good leadership and management remain key to success. Institution-building could be fostered 
on one hand by giving senior international personnel mostly local deputies, and on the other hand 
by providing local counterparts with an equal percentage of international employees. In the first 
instance, by following their mentors, receiving regular feedback and constructive criticism, local 
employees working under international staff can be exposed to norms and methods that will 
 
and prison guards; and an increased public awareness and dialogue about criminal processes and the role they fulfill 
in post-conflict societies.” 
26 See Suzanne Katzenstein, Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245 
[hereinafter Justice in East Timor] Katzenstein’s discussion of East Timor capacity-building programs is worth 
noting: “Some critical errors were made. One of the most notorious involves the selection of mentors and trainers for 
the Public Defenders’ Office. The UNDP funded two positions for mentors beginning in the spring of 2001. Both 
proved to be catastrophes. The first mentor had no experience as a criminal defense lawyer, and had never litigated a 
case. He was a lecturer in commercial law. The other mentor had practiced as a defense lawyer but could not speak 
any of the court's four languages. Communication between mentor and mentee was all but impossible.” 
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improve their work as judges, prosecutors and public defenders later on.27 In the second scenario, 
international employees of senior local judges and lawyers can help serve as a cultural and 
linguistic bridge for their superiors, and bring to bear some of their administrative and legal 
know-how in their work. The same suppositions hold true in reverse, with international staff 
learning valuable lessons from their local mentors and deputies. Such exchanges would result in 
cross-fertilization, capacity-building, and mutual education, so long as foreign staff is well-
versed in the jurisprudence of the international tribunals and good court management practices 
generally (an assumption which has not always been borne out in extant hybrids). Additionally, 
cross-fertilization can be enhanced by mandating regular joint strategy meetings and 
informational presentations, where local and international counterparts can be required to explain 
their work to each other and give each other feedback, advice and support.  
Hybrids’ structures should incorporate providing continuing legal education (CLE) to 
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and court personnel.28 The CLE Training component 
could be continuous, mixing academic and practical training, flexibly designed and, when 
appropriate, implemented jointly with other international training programs to provide additional 
training assistance in domestic trials.29 If hybrids are linked to entities like the UNDP that focus 
on legal reform and institution-building, they can stimulate local reform even beyond their staff.  
Trial observer programs could also be incorporated that entitle local trial observers to 
attend and observe all judicial proceedings, or even require them to review, assess and evaluate 
hybrid war crimes trials. The programs could arrange for periodic inspections of case papers 
relating to proceedings. The trial observer program could also envisage a partnership where 
 
27 Ibid.; See also see Suzannah Linton, Rising from the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System in 
East Timor. 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 122. [Hereinafter Rising from the Ashes], at 134. 
28 See Ellis, Serbia’s New Court, supra note 13. Mark S. Ellis is the Executive Director of the International Bar 
Association in London, England. 
29 Ibid.  
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program staff would each be linked with some domestic judicial personnel, to review, assess and 
evaluate domestic court proceedings on the basis of efficiency, due process, competency and 
appropriateness. At the conclusion of each trial, the program staff trial observers could privately 
meet with the relevant domestic judicial personnel to review the trial and make recommendations 
for improvement.30 Along the same line, an internship program specifically targeted at local law 
students could be envisaged, along with regular delegations of different groups to observe 
proceedings (Paramount Chiefs, imams, Buddhist monks, amputees, widows’ associations, ex-
combatants, school-children, etc).  
Turnover of infrastructure 
The infrastructure erected for hybrid courts, be it large-scale construction projects for 
courts and detention facilities or small changes such as stocks of tape recorders and 
microphones, are fed back into the local justice system at the conclusion of the hybrid court’s 
term. Infrastructure creation for hybrids is also useful for the local judiciary insofar as it can 
serve as a model, and its development for the hybrid can train service providers, such that they 
will be better able to serve the local justice system down the line. In countries where justice 
system’s infrastructures were devastated by war, and were not particularly professional to begin 
with, this is not a negligible factor. A caveat to this argument is that some infrastructure created 
by hybrids is a poisoned gift for judiciaries too poor to maintain buildings or other legacies 
appropriately.  
Cultural accessibility  
For obvious cultural reasons, local investigators, litigators, judges, administrators, and 
communications officials have a much easier time interpreting local populations’ criticisms and 
 
30  Ibid. 
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responding strategically. Where an American in Sierra Leone may not suspect that a statement 
will appear offensive or that a gesture may come off as confusing, a Sierra Leonean will know it 
and act accordingly.  
Since locals, unlike internationals, are inextricably tied to their country, their stake in 
communicating effectively and convincing indigenous populations of their perspectives may be 
greater than their international counterparts. It would be difficult to imagine a Bosnian saying, as 
Richard Goldstone did, that it was not financially worthwhile for the ICTY to translate 
documents into Bosnian, Serb, and Croat, because there were too many local languages.31 
Likewise, local might have noted that the selection of French and English as working languages 
in the ICTY is consistent with UN practice, but perverse, since French has a negligible audience 
in the former Yugoslavia. Great expense was incurred in translating materials into French, while 
materials in the local languages of the former Yugoslavia remain largely unavailable.  
Farther removed (emotionally and culturally32 as well as physically) from the location of 
the genocide or atrocities that they work on, international tribunal staff have an easier time 
privileging the idea of “establishing important precedent” over helping people on the ground.  
In hybrid courts, “International actors have the opportunity to gain greater sensitivity to 
local issues, local culture, and local approaches to justice at the same time that local actors can 
learn from international actors.”33  
 
31 Author’s interview with Richard Goldstone, former Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda at Yale (April 23, 2003).  
32 Having a hybrid court ensures that at least part of the staff will be genuinely invested in the country, unlike some 
international technocrats. See e.g., Andrew England, UN Tribunal Struggles to Be Model of International Justice in 
Remote African Town, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 4, 2002, [hereinafter UN Tribunal Struggles to Be Model of 
International Justice] available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/rwanda/2002/0504remote.html
England found that in the ICTR, “Tribunal officials… complain about the difficulties of recruiting people and 
working in a small African town which has few amenities and intermittent water and electricity. ‘It's not easy to stay 
and live here,’ Hague-based chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte said. ‘I could not stay one year working in Arusha. ... 
If it is like that for me, can you imagine what it is like for others? That is also a reason you cannot have the best 
people to work here.’”  
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As a caveat to these reflections, a brief examination of communications failures in 
various existing hybrids clearly indicates that hybridity is not a surefire answer. Gross 
mismanagement can trump the model’s potential to facilitate and improve outreach. In Kosovo 
and East Timor for instance, politicking, lack of will and professionalism, and material problems 
(such as the frequent absence of court reporters, translators, stenographers, web technicians, and 
public liaison officers) have often prevented the courts from connecting with local populations.34 
Good management practices remain indispensable in all models of justice. 
Physical accessibility  
“Even if a country truly cannot try its own or participate in that process, the people of that 
country should at the very least be consulted and kept informed of what the international ad hoc 
or permanent tribunals are doing, ostensibly on their behalf.”35 Physical location is critical to 
accessibility. For impoverished victims of atrocities in third world countries who wish to observe 
perpetrators being tried, or who just want to see how the tribunal works, physical distance 
between the locus of atrocities and the place where trials are conducted presents an 
insurmountable barrier. Victims’ family and friends, or even ordinary (but impecunious) citizens, 
are more likely to attend proceedings if what is involved is a short bus ride, and not an 
international odyssey. For instance,  
to many surviving family members of the victims of the Rwandan genocide, it matters a 
great deal whether an alleged perpetrator of mass atrocity is paraded before the local 
press, judged in a local courtroom in a language that they can understand, subjected to 
local procedures, and given a sentence that accords with local sentiments, including 
perhaps the death penalty. Given a choice between local justice and justice once removed 
(as in a trial in Tanzania under unfamiliar processes and judges), it should hardly be a 
surprise if most survivors of the Rwanda genocide, and not merely Rwandan government 
 
33 See Dickinson The Case of Kosovo, supra note 12.  
34 See Human Rights Watch, Justice Denied for East Timor. Dec. 20, 2002, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/timor/etimor1202bg.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Justice Denied 
for East Timor].  
35 See Nizich, Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 15.  
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officials, prefer local trials or local plea bargains, especially where it appears that national 
venues may produce quicker results than prolonged international processes.36
 
For witnesses testifying in international tribunals, the already formidable psychological 
barriers (fear of reprisals for being involved, anxiety about reliving past traumas, shame, etc)37 
are supplemented by logistical hurdles they face with international courts. These include 
difficulties in paying for transportation and lodging, impossibility of acquiring visas, and trouble 
taking too much time off work. 
Linguistic accessibility  
Trials held locally in local languages are inherently more accessible to local populations: 
easier for journalists, observers, and general audiences to understand, report on, gossip about, 
and ultimately, identify with.   
Trials that have to be conducted, as are those in the ICTR, through the aid of interpreters 
and without the knowledge of local culture and manners are bound to lead to 
misunderstandings at all levels. Thus, as the Akayesu judgment itself acknowledges, the 
ICTR judges in that case had to wrestle with subtleties in the way Rwandans express 
themselves that made it difficult to tell whether witnesses had actually witnessed acts that 
they were reporting or reporting what others had seen and told them. It is difficult to 
know whether the judges came to the correct conclusions concerning such culturally 
sensitive questions.38
 
Where purely international war crimes tribunals may graft on translators in a subordinate 
function, hybrid courts’ very structure can underscore an understanding of and valuing of local 
languages and cultures. In hybrids, translation and cultural mediation become an integral part of 
the tribunal rather than an afterthought or a bureaucratic detail.  
 
36 See Alvarez, Crimes of States, supra note 12. 
37 For a general perception among Rwandan witnesses that the ICTR mistreated them, see Wanda E. Hall, “Go 
Home” Rwandans Tell Del Ponte and Dieng, INTERNEWS, 27 June 2002  “An estimated 3500 demonstrators, 
organized by genocide survivor organizations IBUKA and AVEGA, surrounded the prosecutor's headquarters of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) this morning, to protest alleged harassment of witnesses.” For 
more discussion on criticism from Rwandan women’s organizations of the ICTR, see also Madre, Demanding 
Justice: Rape and Reconciliation in Rwanda, at http://www.madre.org/country_rwan_demand.html  
38 See Alvarez, Crimes of States, supra note 12. 
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To further hybrids’ potential in this regard, a few management tools offer potential. 
Registrars/administrators of hybrids could mandate a one month crash course in local language 
for lower-level international staff upon arrival, prior to beginning work, and offer free intensive 
language tutoring to all staff upon request. Moreover, recruitment on the basis of language as 
well as talent – affirmative action for polyglots – could help break down language barriers. 
Accessibility to local media 
Local news reporters, often facing the tight budget of a tiny newspaper or radio station, 
cannot afford taking regular international trips. Cutting the local press out of the loop has 
tremendous implications on the wider population, which typically relies primarily on local media 
for obvious linguistic reasons. Even if elites are able to understand and tune into the international 
press, TV, and radio that travel to The Hague or elsewhere, most people in the world rely on 
local news. Indeed, vulnerable populations who suffer disproportionately during wars are 
typically the least educated and hence the least likely to comprehend or benefit from 
international media attention to war crimes trials. Conducting trials on-site in the countries where 
atrocities took place thus removes mundane financial and logistical hurdles that reporters face, 
making it easier for them to cover trials and help the trials mesh into the fabric of local people’s 
lives in more diffuse ways.  
Beyond a recognition that the media can serve as a positive outlet for information 
dissemination, a darker rationale for involvement of local media must be considered as well. The 
role of local radio, newspapers, and television in fomenting conflict or broadcasting 
inflammatory, ethnically divisive propaganda has been well documented in numerous instances. 
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While Radio Mille Collines39 remains the most notorious, local press in the Former Yugoslavia 
also provides an instance of local media inciting violence and dangerously exacerbating 
tensions.40 Rabble-rousing, provocative, irresponsible journalism remains a reality in numerous 
post-atrocity countries. This makes it all the more important to incorporate media outreach in 
war crimes tribunals, educate journalists, and to provide intelligible, easily accessible 
information for local media representatives, which is harder to distort. 
It is not enough to merely hope that hybrids will do better local media outreach by virtue 
of being culturally closer. Hybrids should have outreach departments primarily focused on local 
press, radio, and TV. 
Fostering a sense of local ownership 
Insofar as popular sympathy typically flows in some part from a sense of ownership and 
familiarity, local populations relate more easily to post-conflict criminal bodies that can be 
understood in familiar terms. Hybrid courts with local staff have special potential for creating a 
sense of legitimacy by mobilizing popular support. Studies suggest that among the things 
observers of any judicial process value is the sense that fellow community members have been 
treated fairly by someone who understands their arguments.41 This partially explains “why some 
 
39 For a brief but balanced summary of Radio Mille Collines’ role in the Rwandan genocide, see RNW Hate Radio 
Rwanda, available at http://www.rnw.nl/realradio/dossiers/html/rwanda-h.html “RTLM is the most widely reported 
symbol of hate radio throughout the world. Its broadcasts, disseminating hate propaganda and inciting to murder 
Tutsis and opponents to the regime, began on 8 July 1993, and greatly contributed to the 1994 genocide of hundreds 
of thousands. RTLM, aided by the staff and facilities of Radio Rwanda, the government-owned station, called on the 
Hutu majority to destroy the Tutsi minority. The programmes were relayed to all parts of the country via a network 
of transmitters owned and operated by Radio Rwanda. After Rwandan Patriotic Front troops drove the government 
forces out of Kigali in July 1994, RTLM used mobile FM transmitters to broadcast disinformation from inside the 
French-controlled zone on the border between Rwanda and Zaire, causing millions of Hutus to flee toward refugee 
camps where they could be regrouped and recruited as future fighters.” 
40 For instance, “In a damning report on the conduct of Albanian broadcast journalists during March's riots in 
Kosovo, the OSCE has accused major broadcasting outlets of whipping up ethnic tension in the territory and 
contributing to a mood of vengeful persecution through sloppy, tendentious and biased reporting” IWPR Balkan 
Crisis Report, No. 494, April 30, 2004, http://www.medienhilfe.ch/News/2004/Kos/IWPR494.htm  
41 Excellent studies on the US criminal justice system by scholars like Tyler demonstrate that the law’s legitimacy in 
the US with minority groups does not depend much on the racial make-up of law enforcement/judiciary. Rather, 
 21
Ethel Higonnet 
Hybrids: the Future of International Accountability and Criminal Prosecutions 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
international adjudicative processes, including institutionalized forms of arbitration and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), provide mechanisms for party-appointed arbitrators and 
judges.”42 Having local judges may help shape the local perceptions about war crimes trials, and 
hence their legitimacy.  
Rebuilding the credibility/ legitimacy of the local legal system and government 
For many in post-conflict states, seeing the local judicial system at least partially 
involved in important trials may be critical to rebuilding a sense of faith in the courts. Besides 
restoring the legitimacy of devastated legal systems, local connections with well-run, high-
profile trials may benefit transitional governments’ credibility. A hybrid trial, even extensively 
influenced by international elements, demonstrates to local populations that local members of the 
judiciary can mete out justice. By contrast, marginalizing local institutions and actors 
undermines their authority and casts aspersions on their capabilities (in some cases rightfully so). 
This matters because “on a day-to-day basis, more people rely on the protection and viability of 
their own local law and institutions than on international law or the U.N.” For instance, “the 
Rwandan people have a greater interest and stake in empowering their own local courts” and 
improving them “than in protecting the credibility of the Security Council.”43  
2c. Recognition of the importance of local empowerment by key decision-makers 
 
they find that it is tied to perceptions of procedural fairness and the question of whether people sensed that they were 
respected. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990) If this parallel holds true, then the ethnic 
makeup of a war crimes tribunal (purely international or partly local), might matter far less than the mode of 
operation and perceived efficiency/respectfulness of staff. However, to mitigate this critique of the necessity for 
local staff in war crimes tribunals, one can counter that international staff have a harder time engaging with local 
populations in ways that are culturally sensitive and perceived as respectful.  
42 See Alvarez, Crimes of States, supra note 12. Cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 31, June 26, 
1945 (permitting party-appointed ad hoc judges); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States, art. 37, available at http://www.internationaladr.com/tc11.htr (permitting party-
appointed arbitrators). The international precedents where this tradition has not been followed, as with respect to the 
U.N.'s El Salvador Truth Commission, have usually emerged when state parties have themselves agreed to 
"denationalization" or to forego appointing ad hoc adjudicators. See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations 
Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497, 503 (1994). It is also true, of course, that the El 
Salvador process did not involve criminal prosecutions. 
43 See Alvarez, Crimes of States, supra note 12. 
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While arguments for local empowerment in war crimes tribunals may seem questionable, 
many voices within the international human rights and legal community have expressed 
reservations about the internationalization of war crimes trials, or at least recognize the value of 
connecting with local populations. Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue for trials held 
locally whenever possible. Even the president of the ICTY, Judge Theodor Meron, noted that 
“war crimes trials in the area where crimes have been committed have the greatest resonance 
because they would then take place close to the victims, close to the people, and not thousands of 
miles away.”44 Likewise, the former lead prosecutor in the Rwanda tribunal’s first case, Pierre-
Richard Prosper, now U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, said experience has shown 
the ICTs were too far from where the crimes were committed.45 Even prominent human rights 
organizations considered hardliners because of their tenacious support for international courts 
acknowledge the value of local ownership and participation in post-conflict justice mechanisms. 
For instance, Human Rights Watch declared that “where fundamental guarantees of justice and 
fairness can be met, it is the primary responsibility of national courts to prosecute human rights 
crimes.” 46  
Likewise, local decision-makers/elites in post-atrocity countries often endorse local input. 
For instance, “incoming Sierra Leonean President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah opposed a full-fledged 
international tribunal because he thought some Sierra Leonean participation in and ownership of 
the trial process was important.”47 Similarly, the post-genocide Rwandan government was keen 
 
44 See the interview of the president of the ICTY, Judge Theodor Meron during his visit to Belgrade, by B92's 
Ljubica Gojgic, at http://www.b92.net/intervju/eng/2003/meron.php   
45 See England, UN Tribunal Struggles to Be Model of International Justice, supra note 32. 
46 See Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Priorities for the International Community, June 20, 2000, at 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/06/secmem0620.html    
47 See Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, supra note 21. 
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to receive international financial aid and training to rebuild its devastated judiciary, and was 
reluctant to accept a purely international tribunal to prosecute the génocidaires.  
3. EXAMPLES OF HYBRID COURTS: 
Moving away from a more theoretical, aspirational description of the hybrid model’s 
potential, this section will describe extant hybrids, often exploring their shortcomings. First it 
will outline the earliest hybrid in East Timor, noting that the Timorese hybrid suffered greatly 
from under-funding and political problems. Beset by tribulations ranging from irresponsible 
transfers of authority by UN and failure of capacity-building programs, to inexperienced East 
Timorese officials, it did not live up to its full potential. Next this section will summarize the 
evolution of the Regulation 64 Panels in the Courts of Kosovo, briefly exploring how Kosovo 
improved on the hybrid model, integrating international staff into the local judicial system and 
speeding up and improving the quality of local decisions. The third part of this section will look 
at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and argue that it has achieved yet higher standards of 
efficacy. Fourth, this section describes the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia although this 
hybrid has not yet come into being. In conclusion, this section will briefly touch on the Iraq 
Special Tribunal. 
3a. East Timor’s Serious Crimes Unit: Special Panels for Serious Crimes within the District 
Court in Dili 
In the aftermath of horrific human rights violations which the Indonesian army 
orchestrated to intimidate independence activists during the 1999 independence referendum in 
East Timor, the international community’s outrage eventually pressured the reluctant Indonesian 
government into holding trials. With the UN largely in control of East Timor but loath to 
confront Indonesia, the UN relied on Indonesian promises that suspects would be tried in Jakarta. 
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At the same time, the UN established a partly internationalized institution in East Timor's capital, 
Dili.48 Acting under the jurisdiction of the District Court of Dili, the hybrid applied both 
international law and the hybrid laws of UNTAET-administered East Timor with national and 
international judges. Special Panels were created at the District Court of Dili to exercise 
jurisdiction over cases of Serious Crimes. 49   
Unfortunately, as the first criminal body of its kind, operating in a devastated island 
dangerously near an unrepentant colonizer, the East Timor tribunal was particularly vulnerable. 
Neither the Jakarta trials50 nor UN-sponsored trials in the District Court of Dili established the 
long-awaited accountability promised to East Timorese victims. Severely under-funded51 and 
 
48 See, e.g., UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, On the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor (Nov. 
27, 1999); UNTAET Regulation 1999/3, On the Establishment of a Transitional Judicial Service Commission (Dec. 
3, 1999), as amended by UNTAET Regulation 2000/25 (Aug. 3, 2000); UNTAET Regulation 2000/11(providing for 
a mixed panel of national and international judges in the special panels in East Timor), On the Organization of 
Courts in East Timor (Mar. 6, 2000), as amended by UNTAET Regulation 2000/14 (May 10, 2000); UNTAET 
Regulation 2000/15, On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences 
(June 6, 2000); UNTAET Regulation 2000/16, On the Organization of the Public Prosecution Service in East Timor 
(June 6, 2000). All UNTAET regulations are available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/UntaetR.htm  
49 See Linton, Rising from the Ashes, supra note 27. 
50 Facing intense international pressure, Indonesian authorities reluctantly charged political and military leaders in 
Jakarta with failing to prevent the violence, although most observers, including the Indonesian Human Rights 
Commission, acknowledged that the defendants had orchestrated the violence. The court is patently biased in favor 
of the defence. By August 2004, it had acquitted or overturned the convictions of all Indonesians indicted for crimes 
against humanity in East Timor, and cut in half the 10-year sentence of Eurico Guterres, the former leader of the 
notorious Aitarak militia in East Timor.  For an informed commentary, see David Cohen (UC Berkeley War Crimes 
Studies Center and International Center for Transitional Justice), Intended to Fail: The Trials before the ad hoc 
Human Rights Court in Jakarta, http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/IntendedtoFail.pdf or Human Rights 
Watch, Indonesia: Courts Sanction Impunity for East Timor Abuses, August 7, 2004, 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/06/indone9205.htm  
51 The Serious Crimes Unit inability to function adequately because of under-funding has been widely publicized by 
NGOs and in the media. See e.g. Ms. Shantha Rau, Information Services Coordinator, NGO Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, 777 UN Plaza 12th Floor, New York, New York 10017, http://www.iccnow.org. 
“Appointments to key positions in the judiciary were left vacant, paralyzing the court”; Joanna Jolly, “Investigators 
Struggle with Criminal Lack of Resources,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, China), 14 November 2000, 
18; “UN Pledges More Resources to East Timor’s Chief Investigator,” Agence France-Presse (Jakarta, Indonesia), 
20 November 2000: “The UN chief investigator for serious crimes in East Timor has agreed not to resign after last 
minute pledges by the body's administrators to supply his unit with desperately needed resources .... Two-thirds of 
the 56 people arrested on suspicion of serious crimes in the province have been released because the Special Crimes 
Unit lacked the resources to continue their investigations; East Timor's Non Government Organisations (NGOs) 
Forum declared in a report that 'The Serious Crimes Unit has only been allocated the resources to investigate a very 
small proportion of the alleged war crimes…It is grossly understaffed, and lacking anything like sufficient basic 
necessities as interpreters, transport and computers.”
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inefficient, the Serious Crimes Unit suffered from a premature UN transfer of control to 
inexperienced East Timorese judiciary, the failure of capacity-building programs, and domestic 
politicking.52 Many of the SCU’s failings can also be attributed to the UN’s “persistent failure to 
consult in a genuine and meaningful way with the East Timorese,” its “bureaucratic and 
inflexible institutional nature,”53 and contradictions in the role of the UN, whose staff was often 
overstretched, inexperienced,54 and disorganized.55 The court’s impact on local populations was 
jeopardized by its failure to value local participation, and its jurisprudence was laid open to 
criticism by its failure to uphold due process standards. “The slow pace and questionable quality 
of [UNTAET's investigations]… has resulted in a loss of confidence among the East Timorese in 
UNTAET's ability or will to bring perpetrators to justice.” Indeed, “key organizations are now 
unwilling to cooperate with the Serious Crimes Unit.”56
However, some argue that the accomplishments of the court must be understood in the 
context of its mission and the situation it confronted. Suzannah Linton argues that the challenges 
                                                 
52 See Katzenstein, Justice in East Timor, supra note 26: “The East Timorese government…has played a significant 
role in undermining the training-mentoring programs, contributing to the tribunal's continual lack of resources, and 
stalling judicial appointments to the Special Panels. Officials in the Ministry of Justice have rejected numerous 
substantial offers for funding for the tribunal and capacity-building programs. It is reported, but unconfirmed, that in 
the summer of 2002, USAID donated U.S. $ 8.2 million to civil society organizations after its offers to the judiciary 
‘basically to write a blank check’ were declined…One employee of an NGO funding organization in Australia 
expressed deep frustration that its offers to unconditionally fund numerous positions for international staff in the 
Public Defenders' Office were also rejected… The Ministry's repeated rejection of offers for funds and international 
staff can be attributed to a deeply held political agenda in which the installing of Portuguese as the official and 
working language of the courts has been given primacy over all else. Language politics have been a volatile subject 
between the East Timorese government and the UN administration.” 
53 See Linton, Rising from the Ashes, supra note 27. 
54 Institution-building in East Timor should have focused on bringing in international expertise for a transitional 
period, with multiple East Timorese counterparts appointed as deputies on probation with each international to 
receive appropriate training. They could gradually be empowered and ultimately assume full responsibility as 
judges, prosecutors and public defenders. 
55 See Katzenstein, Justice in East Timor, supra note 26. 
56 Amnesty International, East Timor: Justice past, present and future, 27 July 2001, ASA 57/001/2001. pt 3.4: 
'While recognising the size and complexity of its work, Amnesty International is concerned by the slow pace at 
which UNTAET investigations are proceeding .... A number of suspects have already spent more than ten months in 
detention without indictment'.      
 26
Ethel Higonnet 
Hybrids: the Future of International Accountability and Criminal Prosecutions 
 
faced “cannot be overstated”57 and that UNTAET’s justice initiatives must be situated against the 
background of its mandate “to build a nation from scratch.” She emphasizes that UNTAET 
“became custodian of a traumatized and ravaged land with barely a building left intact from the 
maelstrom of violence in 1999.”58 The UN “created a judicial system where before there had 
been none. Within this fragile system, it carved out a special mechanism for dealing with the 
most unspeakable atrocities.” 59 Although the tribunal still faces tremendous challenges arising 
from the physical devastation of the 1999 campaign, the exodus of many qualified East 
Timorese, and resources shortages, “the tribunal continues to improve. The SCU, in particular, 
has responded to criticism effectively and has undergone substantial restructuring and vast 
improvement over the past year.”60 UNTAET has responded positively to critiques of “its early 
tendency towards benevolent paternalism, which sidelined the East Timorese” and now 
“‘Timorisation’ has become a key objective of the mission, with East Timorese gradually being 
                                                 
57 See Linton, Rising from the Ashes, supra note 27. 
58 Ibid.  
59 See Human Rights Watch, Justice Denied for East Timor, supra note 34. 
60 Ibid.: The SCU “improved management and recruitment problems, strengthened its training and mentoring 
programs, and enhanced its public education and outreach efforts.” See Katzenstein, Justice in East Timor, supra 
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moved into leadership positions.” In spite of the qualitative inadequacy of some of the trials,61 
these and other positive developments62 must inform critiques of the SCU’s work.  
3b. Regulation “64” Panels in the Courts of Kosovo  
In June of 1999, after a NATO-led bombing campaign helped put a stop to mass 
atrocities in Kosovo committed primarily by Serb forces against ethnic Albanians, the United 
Nations Security Council issued a resolution establishing the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK).63 Charged with restoring some measure of law and order in a zone devastated by war 
and decades of discrimination against ethnic Albanians, UNMIK’s mandate included trying those 
responsible for past atrocities. With a local judicial system in shambles, physical infrastructure 
terribly damaged, prisoners languishing in jails, and the ICTY only prepared to try those who 
committed the worst atrocities on the widest scale,64 UNMIK made “an effort to address what 
was rapidly becoming an accountability and justice crisis.”65 The taint of the former oppressive 
 
61 Ibid., reference to Siphosami Malunga & Shyamala Alegendra, Prosecuting Serious Crimes in East Timor: An 
Analysis of the Justice System, Aug. 2002 (unpublished paper, on file with Katzenstein).]; David Cohen, Seeking 
Justice on the Cheap: is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, East-West Center, AsiaPacific 
Issues No. 61, August 2002, [hereinafter Seeking Justice on the Cheap] available at 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources.htm., noting that through 2003, the accused were routinely detained beyond 
the seventy-two-hour limit and before their preliminary hearings. Some of the accused have been left in prisons for 
months or even years while awaiting trial. Cases have been repeatedly delayed for lack of translators or judges; 
Judicial System Monitoring Programme Press Release, East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes: More 
Postponements than Hearings, Oct. 11, 2002, at http://www.jsmp.minhub.org/News/12N_10_02.htm.; Judicial 
System Monitoring Programme Press Release, East Timor Urgently Needs Court of Appeal to Guarantee 
Fundamental Human Rights, Oct. 14, 2002, at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/News/14N_10_02.htm., noting that in 
the cases that have been prosecuted and especially in the earlier ones, the judges neglected to apply international law 
or applied it incorrectly, and handed down harsh sentences for low-level perpetrators. 
62 “The high number of indictments filed and cases adjudicated might suggest that the tribunal has been [partially] 
successful in fulfilling its mandate,” at least in some respects. See Katzenstein, Justice in East Timor, supra note 26, 
“Since hearing its first trial in January 2001, the SCU has investigated and filed 45 indictments for serious crimes 
against 140 individuals. These indictments resulted in trials and convictions for thirty-one individuals, spanning all 
levels of the Indonesian military and East Timorese militia command structure. As of January 2003, there were 
twenty cases pending before the Special Panels in which the accused were present in East Timor, although some 
were still in the pre-trial stage. 
63 UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo (July 25, 1999), available 
online at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo1.shtml  
64 See Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the ICTY, Statement on the Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed in Kosovo, (Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm . 
65 See Dickinson, The Case of Kosovo, supra note 12. 
 28
Ethel Higonnet 
Hybrids: the Future of International Accountability and Criminal Prosecutions 
 
                                                
regime undermined public confidence in the justice system, which had systematically excluded 
ethnic Albanians and had been run by Serbians perceived as oppressors.  
The courts also lacked experienced personnel after the UNMIK takeover of Kosovo, 
since “only a few Serb judges were willing to serve, and even those who were appointed 
subsequently stepped down, in response to pressure from Belgrade.”66  The lack of Serb 
representation within the judiciary threw into doubt the legitimacy and independence of courts 
among the local Serbian population. Some rulings by Albanian judges against Serb defendants 
were considered so dubious that they were later thrown out by mixed panels with international 
and local judges. Such problems were exacerbated by local resentment at the UN’s early failure 
to consult with locals when making decisions about the judiciary, a failure exacerbated by the 
post-war lack of elected officials or a functional civil society.67
After much debate over the creation of a special court, to be called the Kosovo War and 
Ethnic Crimes Court,68 under-funding and political obstacles led to an impasse and the court was 
abandoned.69 In response to this breakdown, “U.N. authorities issued a series of regulations 




68 The court was to have concurrent jurisdiction with the ICTY, but would focus on the less high-profile offenders 
that the ICTY did not have the capacity to try. 
69 For an overview of efforts to establish the rule of law in post-conflict Kosovo, see Wendy S. Betts, Scott N. 
Carlson, & Gregory Gisvold, The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the Lessons Learned in 
Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and the Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371 (2001) at 381; Hansjorg Strohmeyer, 
Making Multilateral Interventions Work: the United Nations and the Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in 
Kosovo and East Timor, 25:2 FLETCHER FOR. WORLD AFF. 107 (2001); Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and 
Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 
(2001). 
70 International judges had minimal impact initially, as they did not comprise a majority on the trial panels. See, 
OSCE, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Legal Systems Monitoring Section, Kosovo's War Crimes 
Trials: A Review, at 12 (Sept. 2002), at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/ [hereinafter 
Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials]. A new UNMIK regulation enacted in December 2000 sought to rectify this problem, 
See UNMIK Regulation 2000/64, (Dec. 15, 2000) available at http://www.unmikonline.org. After that date, all war 
crimes cases have been held in front of courts composed of a majority of international judges, with international 
prosecutors primarily in charge of prosecutions.  
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allowing foreign lawyers to team up with domestic lawyers to prosecute and defend the cases.”71 
These UN regulations led to the creation of the “Regulation 64 panels” in the courts of Kosovo, 
applying a blend of international and domestic law.72 “The hope was that the infusion of foreign 
experts would jumpstart the judicial process, providing badly needed capacity and 
independence.”73  
The Regulation 64 Panels in the Courts of Kosovo experienced numerous problems,74 
especially in finding funding and hiring qualified international personnel. Some of the 
international judges brought in proved to be culturally insensitive, inadequately skilled and/or 
versed in international law, or had deficient English skills.75 There was “no mechanism for the 
mentoring of local judges and, in Pristina, international and local judges even have offices in 
different buildings.”76  As a result, some commentators like Sylvia de Bertodano have declared 
the Regulation 64 Panels to be a disappointment.77  
 
71 Ibid.; See e.g., UNMIK Regulation 1999/5, On the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Court of Final Appeal and an Ad 
Hoc Office of the Public Prosecutor (Sept. 4, 1999); UNMIK Regulation 1999/6, On Recommendations for 
Structure and Administration of the Judiciary and Prosecution Service (Sept. 7, 1999); UNMIK Regulation 2000/15, 
On the Establishment of the Administrative Department of Justice (June 6, 2000). 
72 See Dickinson, The Case of Kosovo, supra note 13: “Initially, with little consultation with the local population, 
UNMIK authorities declared the applicable law in Kosovo to be Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)/Serbian law, 
modified to conform to international human rights standards. This decision outraged many ethnic Albanian 
Kosovars, who identified FRY/Serbian law as the law of the oppressive Serb regime. Kosovar Albanian judges 
refused to apply the law, resulting in widespread confusion. In response, UNMIK issued new resolutions describing 
the applicable law to be the law in force in Kosovo prior to March 22, 1989. But like the initial decision, the 
applicable law was to be a hybrid of pre-existing local law and international standards. Local law was only 
applicable to the extent that it did not conflict with international human rights norms”. 
73 See also Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights 
and the Rule of Law, Legal Systems Monitoring Section, Report 9 - On the Administration of Justice, Mar. 2002, at 
5-6, available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/Report9<uscore>eng.pdf  
74 See OSCE, Kosovo's War Crimes Trials, supra note 70.   
75 International Crisis Group, Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo 5-6 (ICG Balkans Report 134, 
2002), available at http://www.reliefweb.int. 
76 Ibid.  
77 Sylvia de Bertodano, Current Developments in Internationalized Courts, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 1,1 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2003: “Many Serb defendants have…escaped from custody [since 1999]. 
Further arrests of ethnic Serbs are unlikely as suspects are no longer resident within the jurisdiction…The use of 
internationalized panels in Kosovo has not to date made significant progress towards ending impunity for 
international crimes in the region…The resources that have been applied to the task in both East Timor and Kosovo 
have proved insufficient.” 
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Despite these flaws, and although the influx of international judges did not by any means 
solve all of the local courts’ problems, “the appointment of international judges [and prosecutors] 
to the local courts in…highly sensitive cases [involving serious human rights abuses] helped to 
enhance the perception of the independence of the judiciary and therefore its legitimacy within a 
broad cross-section of the local population.” Most importantly, “the verdicts of the hybrid 
tribunals have alleviated some impartiality concerns, even among Serbs.78 The Kosovar courts 
ultimately held effective trials of alleged perpetrators79 and alleviated a massive legitimacy 
crisis. “At least one report, though critical of the tribunals in many respects, suggests that the 
presence of international actors has improved the quality of justice delivered in these cases.”80 
Clint Williamson, Justice Department Director of Kosovo from October 2001 to November 2002 
assessed the 64 panels as a mixed success. He pointed out that despite some inadequately 
qualified international judges and prosecutors, some intimidation of local staff by perpetrators on 
the ground, and occasional local abdication of responsibility to internationals in high-risk trials, 
the 64 panels proved a very valuable tool in Kosovo. While he encountered widespread 
resentment against the ICTY as an imposition by outsiders, he believed that local and 
international staff maintained very collegial relations within the hybrid structure, which received 
 
78 See Dickinson, The Case of Kosovo, supra note 12, noting that in Kosovo, previous attempts at domestic justice 
had failed to win support among Serbs. Indeed, Serbian judges had refused to cooperate in the administration of 
justice. Verdicts in the cases tried by ethnic Albanians were regarded as tainted by the ethnic Serbian population. 
Serbs now approve more. 
79 As of June 2002, Kosovo courts had held trials in seventeen war crimes cases. For example, as of December, 
2000, there were ten international judges and three international prosecutors serving in the five regions of Kosovo. 
They completed a total of 35 trials and investigations. See United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1196 (2000); see also, OSCE, Department of Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law, Kosovo: A Review of the Criminal Justice Division, Sept. 1, 2000 to Feb. 28, 2001, at 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/criminal<uscore>justice2.pdf; and OSCE, Report, Feb. 2000 
to July 2000, at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/criminal<uscore>justice.pdf   
80 See Dickinson, The Case of Kosovo, supra note 12; see also The Human Rights Center and the International 
Human Rights Law Clinic, University of California, Berkeley, & the Centre for Human Rights, University of 
Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability, and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and 
Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 102, 127-36 (2000) [hereinafter Joint Study].  
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more local buy in.81 An OSCE report endorsed the Kosovo hybrid experiment overall, lending 
credence to arguments that despite significant flaws, Kosovo represents an improvement on the 
hybrid model over the East Timor process.82
3c. Special Court for Sierra Leone83
In the aftermath of a horrific civil war in Sierra Leone, which claimed the lives of an 
estimated 75,000 individuals and displaced a third of the population,84 the Sierra Leonean 
government and the UN set up a Special Court85 to try those who “bear the greatest responsibility 
for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law within the 
territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.”86  A treaty between the UN and the Sierra 
Leone government, the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, established the court in 
2002. While the ICTY and ICTR were established under Security Council resolutions pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and only have jurisdiction over international crimes, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone is a “treaty-based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and 
composition.”87 Rather than being a subsidiary organ of the UN, or directly administered by the 
 
81 Author’s telephone interview with Clint Williamson, Justice Department director of Kosovo from October 2001 to 
November 2002, on Tuesday, December 07, 2004 
82 See OSCE, Kosovo's War Crimes Trials, supra note 70.   
83 The Sierra Leone Special Court’s website is http://www.sc-sl.org; The NGO No Peace Without Justice has also 
established a special Web site concerning the Sierra Leone Special Court that includes a consolidated version of the 
Sierra Leone Statute and the Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement, http://www.specialcourt.org  
84 See Diane Marie Amann, Message as Medium in Sierra Leone, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237.  
85 Letter Dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2000/786 (2000). Attached to this letter was an annex 
containing the letter of the president of Sierra Leone and the "Framework for the special court for Sierra Leone”; See 
also Nicole Fritz and Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 391, 400 (2001). 
86 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/915 
(2000), at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf  [hereinafter Secretary-General's Sierra Leone Report]. 
The annex contains the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement] and the 
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UN, the Special Court for Sierra Leone is independent from the UN and from the Sierra Leone 
government and court system.88 This sets the Special Court for Sierra Leone apart from other 
international and hybrid tribunals, which were not products of local decision-makers reaching an 
agreement with the UN.89
The novel structure of the Special Court for Sierra Leone cannot be said to be a conscious 
imitation of the Kosovar or Timorese hybrids90 or of ad hoc tribunals. It represents an innovative 
attempt by the United Nations to establish a more efficient and effective international criminal 
body, more open to local participation and influence. The Sierra Leone Special Court diverges 
from the Kosovar model insofar as it is not grafted into the Sierra Leonean justice system, but 
rather hovers outside the national court system, having concurrent jurisdiction with and primacy 
over the domestic courts of Sierra Leone.91 Nonetheless, it shares key similarities with other 
hybrids: hiring local and international staff (with a majority of international judges in each trial 
chamber)92 and applying law that blends international humanitarian law and domestic Sierra 
Leonean law,93 although thus far the indictments have referred only to international law. The 
court will be “ ‘guided by’ both the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR (with respect to the 
interpretation of international humanitarian law) and the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Sierra Leone (with respect to the interpretation of Sierra Leonean law).”94  
 
88 The tribunal employs its own staff and receives its funds directly from donor governments and private donors. 
89 See http://www.sc-sl.org
90 There are no references to Kosovar or Timorese models in any of the Sierra Leone Special Court statutes or other 
papers relating to its establishment. Likewise, the prior hybrids are conspicuously absent in the Court’s website and 
in the literature it produces. 
91 See Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 86, Art. 8 
92 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, Appendix II, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246. 
93 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appendix II, Attachment, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, at art. 1. 
94 See Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, supra note 21. 
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The Special Court for Sierra Leone, like the other hybrids, had to cope with under-
funding95 and insecurity due to local conditions. It has suffered major blows, with the death of 
two prominent indictees (Foday Sankoh and Sam Bokarie),96 the disappearance of a third 
indictee, Johnny Paul Koroma,97 and the fact that a fourth indictee, Charles Taylor, is dodging 
arrest in Nigeria, which took him in with the full knowledge and support of most world leaders.98  
Thus far, however, the Special Court for Sierra Leone is arguably proving to be more 
efficient,99 less costly,100 more accessible to local populations,101 and less politically 
inflammatory with groups of former low-level perpetrators102 than either ad hoc tribunal or the 
 
95 For a discussion of the Sierra Leone Special Court’s lack of funding, see Avril McDonald, Sierra Leone’s 
shoestring Special Court,  at http://www.icrc.org/  
96 For an article on Foday Sankoh’s death, see Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Foday Sankoh's death will not 
diminish the Special Court's role in ending impunity, 30 July 2003, available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR510082003?open&of=ENG-SLE; for an article on Sam Bockarie’s 
death, see Africa Online Freetown, Sierra Leonean president confirms death of rebel, 9 May 2003, 
http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,52949.jsp  
97 For an article on Johnny Paul Koroma’s reported death, see Africa Online Liberia, Sierra Leone war crime 
suspect dead after shootout, 7 May 2003, available at http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,52916.jsp. 
98 For an article on Taylor presence in Nigeria, urging Nigeria to cooperate fully with the Special Court by 
surrendering Taylor, see Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Commitments to the Special Court must remain firm 
and not falter, 16 January 2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR510022004   
99 As of January 2004, top leaders associated with all of the country's former warring factions stand indicted: Charles 
Ghankay Taylor, Foday Sankoh, Johnny Paul Koroma, Sam Bockarie, Issa Hassan Sesay, Alex Tamba Brima, 
Morris Kallon, Sam Hinga Norman, Augustine Gbao, Brima Bazzy Kamara, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, 
Santigie Borbor Kanu. The SCSL has also seen a trend towards rapid and efficient trials, with the 27 January 2004 
Trial Chamber joinder decision that the accused will be tried in three groups at http://www.sc-sl.org/index.html   
100 See Cockayne, The fraying shoestring, supra note 16, “The 2003 Audit of the Court, carried out by a national-
level auditor operating to international accounting standards, indicated that the Court’s operations had to that point 
been carried out in accordance with relevant international financial and management standards.” See also Shauket A. 
Fakie, Report of the Auditor for the year ended 30 June 2003 [submitted to the Management Committee for the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone], available at http://www.sc-sl.org/documents.html. The Report was conducted in 
accordance with the common auditing standards of the Panel of External Auditors of the UN, the specialized 
agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: id, at para. 1. See also the report on the operations of the 
Special Court of the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, U.N. Doc. AP 2003/61/1(OBS-7) (May 6, 2003).  
101 The Special Court for Sierra Leone is the international/hybrid first tribunal to comprise a specialized Outreach 
department, whose purpose is to engage with the local population. This department is separate from the Press and 
Public Relations department, and focuses on reaching out to Sierra Leoneans from all walks of life. 
102 During the summer of 2003, when this author worked in the Sierra Leone Special Court Outreach Department, 
the Department was solicited to give presentations on the Court’s work by all members of Parliament, most of the 
Paramount Chiefs, some of the country’s most important tribal leaders, several Police Chiefs, and the Army’s Chief 
of Staff. These and numerous civil society organizations responded positively to Outreach’s presentations, and 
nearly all ultimately requested continued dialogue and collaboration. There has been very little negative press on the 
Court in local newspapers, with the exception of various accusations leveled at the Court by the Truth Commission 
during an internal scandal of the Commission.  
 34
Ethel Higonnet 
Hybrids: the Future of International Accountability and Criminal Prosecutions 
 
                                                
other two hybrids. It has also garnered more endorsements from local elites and civil society103 
and has been more successful in promoting local justice reform.104  
The formal agreement establishing the Court came only in mid-January 2002.  By 
the end of August 2004 a remarkable number of complex administrative and litigation 
processes had been completed or were well under way: the investigation of crimes to 
international standards; the location and arrest of suspects; the establishment of adequate 
detention facilities; the construction of a court-house and compound after an international 
design competition; the acquisition of 1.6 MW of electrical power for the Court; the 
establishment of a medical clinic; installation of microwave communications links; 
establishment of security capacities and protocols; creation of a website; a large and 
diverse outreach program; the employment and training of hundreds of local and 
international staff in jobs ranging from translation to transport; the disposal of more than 
a hundred and fifty pre-trial motions; and the commencement of two joint trials. These 
are all significant achievements of which the Special Court should be proud.105
 
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)’s thoughtful and detailed analysis 
of the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone106 stands out as one of the best evaluations of 
the court’s formative period. While the report outlines “the tremendous challenges it faces in the 
coming months,” it notes that “after 18 months of operations, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
has shown a clear understanding of its mandate, and its management seems relatively efficient.” 
The report adds that “to date, the Court has avoided the huge and incremental growth of the ad 
hoc tribunals, and its time and budget constraints have kept it under healthy pressure.”107 In large 
part thanks to the exceptional leadership of Robin Vincent, David Crane, and the Management 
Committee, the Special Court for Sierra Leone seems to be an improvement on the hybrid model, 
 
103 In particular, President Kabbah has come to visit the Court several times and publicly endorsed it. 
104 A widely cited legacy of the Court is rule of law reform. See e.g. Human Rights Watch, Bringing Justice: the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. Accomplishments, Shortcomings and Needed Support., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
Vol. 16, no. 8(A) (Sept. 2004),.at 32. This point is emphasized in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, First Annual 
Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (March 31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/specialcourtannualreport2002-2003.pdf., at 3, 28. 
105 For a succinct overview, see Cockayne, The fraying shoestring, supra note 16. A more comprehensive account is 
provided by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, First Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (March 31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/specialcourtannualreport2002-2003.pdf.  
106 Thierry Cruvellier and Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The First Eighteen Months, March 
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although it is too early to qualify it definitively as a success in comparison with other courts108 - 
or to stake claims that it will succeed in shaping the rule of law in a country which still suffers 
from lack of trust in public institutions, corruption, inflation, discontent among ex-combatants, 
lack of economic opportunity, and UNAMSIL’s downsizing. 
3d. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 
During the rule of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, between April 1975 and January 1979, 
an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians were executed or died of starvation and disease – 
approximately one fourth of the population.109 As Khmer Rouge leaders endeavored to transform 
Cambodia into a completely agrarian communist state, they carefully planned and executed 
policies of extermination and horrific human suffering. A Vietnamese intervention overthrew the 
Khmer Rouge and installed a new Cambodian government.110 The defeated Khmer Rouge 
retreated to strongholds along the Thai border, where, aided by China, Thailand, and the US, it 
rearmed and continued to perpetrate crimes against humanity, staging attacks on Cambodia as a 
guerilla force.111 The Khmer Rouge crumbled in 1996, when the Cambodian government gave 
amnesties in return for mass defections from the Khmer Rouge, and disintegrated further yet 
 
108 For general commentary on the Special Court, see Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: 
Conceptual Concerns and Alternatives, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 107 (2001); Robert Cryer, A ‘Special Court’ for 
Sierra Leone, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 435 (2001); Celina Schocken, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview 
and Recommendations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 436; Laurence Juma, The Human Rights Approach to Peace in 
Sierra Leone: The Analysis of the Peace Process and Human Rights Enforcement in a Civil War Situation, DENV. J. 
INT'L L. & POL'Y 325. 
109 David Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 3d ed., Westview Press, 2000; Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian 
history: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945, Yale University Press, 1991, Chandler, Brother Number One: A 
Political Biography of Pol Pot, 2d ed., Westview Press, 2000 [hereinafter Brother Number One]; Ben Kiernan, The 
Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, Yale University Press, 1996 
110 After overthrowing the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam and the post-Khmer Rouge Cambodian government tried Pol Pot 
and Ieng Sary in 1979 and amassed an enormous collection of valuable evidence of Khmer Rouge atrocities. 
However, the defendants guilt was treated as a foregone conclusion, and the prosecution has been decried by many 
commentators as a show trial. 
111 Chandler, Brother Number One, pp. 158-178; Evan Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge; Inside the 
Politics of Nation-building, Silkworm Books 2003. 
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with the death of Pol Pot in April 1998. In June 1997, the then co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia, 
Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh, requested the UN’s assistance in bringing to justice 
individuals responsible for crimes against humanity and genocide. Difficult negotiations dragged 
on for 6 years between the UN and the Cambodian government.112  
Ultimately, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was negotiated between the UN 
and the Cambodian government, adopted by UN General Assembly on March 17, 2003,113 
formally accepted by the Royal Government of Cambodia and the United Nations on June 6, 
2003,114 and unanimously ratified by the Cambodian parliament on October 4, 2004.115 It creates 
a framework for the first hybrid criminal court to apply civil law, and leading to the passing of 
“The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for 
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea” (EC Law). 
The EC Law provides for co-investigating judges to conduct the investigations and co-
prosecutors to prepare indictments against suspects (one international and one Cambodian in 
each case).116 The Tribunal will also have hybrid subject matter jurisdiction over crimes set forth 
 
112 For an excellent historical overview on the delays in creating the EC, see Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis, 
Getting away with genocide? : elusive justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Sydney UNSW Press, 2005. The 
General Assembly commissioned a Group of Experts, who endorsed a plan for trials of former Khmer Rouge 
officials. Hun Sen welcomed the UN proposal but rejected some of its key elements, and established his own special 
task-force, advocating for a domestic trial process with limited international involvement. In turn, the Legal Office 
of the UN issued a confidential “non-paper,” which suggested increasing the tribunal’s independence from the 
government and rejected the amnesty Hun Sen had granted to Ieng Sary. Overall, Cambodia worried that if it could 
not retain sufficient control over the process, the tribunal might exacerbate the continuing process of peace and 
reconciliation, and that an insensitive and zealous approach could generate panic and reignite guerilla warfare. On 
the contrary, the UN feared that Cambodia’s judiciary would be too inexperienced and politically aligned, not 
impartial or independent enough; that the rights of the accused/access to counsel would not be respected; and that 
Hun Sen had amnestied former Khmer Rouge officials suspected of committing atrocities. 
113 Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Cambodian government, adopted by UN 
General Assembly on March 17, 2003 [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding] 
114 Memorandum of Understanding accepted by the Royal Government of Cambodia and the United Nations on June 
6, 2003. 
115 Memorandum of Understanding unanimously ratified by the Cambodian parliament on October 4, 2004 
116 See The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution 
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both in Cambodian law117 and international law.118 The Tribunal is to be located in Phnom 
Penh119 and the official working language shall be Khmer, with translations into English and 
French.120 The Cambodian government and the UN will share the financial burden of the court, 
with Cambodian authorities paying for Cambodian staff expenses and the UN responsible for 
international staff salaries.121
Various critics of the Extraordinary Chambers (EC) refer to fears of an inadequately 
rigorous defense of the Khmer Rouge,122 a “lack of competent judges and established judicial 
infrastructure,”123 the possibility that Cambodian judges will be controlled by the government, 
and fears that certain well-connected potential defendants will escape prosecution.124 Secretary-
General Annan stated “There still remains doubt… regarding the credibility of the Extraordinary 
Chambers, given the precarious state of the judiciary in Cambodia.”125 He reflected the opinion 
of the Group of Experts and others who voiced concerns regarding the lack of a stable, 
established judicial system.126 Other critiques center on the lack of a culture of respect for the 
 
117 See the 1956 Penal Code of Cambodia 
118 See the four 1949 Geneva Conventions; the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict; and the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. 
119 See EC Law, supra note 116, Art. 43. 
120 Ibid., Art. 45. 
121 Ibid., at Art. 17. The Extraordinary Chambers may receive voluntary assistance from foreign governments, 
international institutions, NGOs, and other persons. 
122 Mann (Mac) Bunyanunda, The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whither the Defense? SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW, SEPTEMBER, 2001, NOTE.  
123 Scott Luftglass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nations’ Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the 
Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. REV. 893 
124 It is almost assured that if an international tribunal were convened, it would try the remaining members of the 
Standing Committee of the PDK and the top leaders who held government posts. A recent report by the War Crimes 
Research Office ("WCRO") at American University and the Coalition for International Justice identifies seven 
possible candidates for prosecution. See Stephen Heder with Brian D. Tittemore, War Crimes research Office, Seven 
Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge (2001). The report identifies: Nuon 
Chea, Communist Party Deputy Secretary; Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs; Khieu Samphan, 
State Presidium Chairman; Ta Mok, Central Committee Member; Kae Pok, Central Committee Member; Sou Met 
and Meah Mut, both Military Division Chairmen. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Group of Experts Report, para. 129; letter dated 21 June 1997 from the First and Second Prime Ministers of 
Cambodia addressed to the UN Secretary-General, annexed to UN Doc. A/1997/488 of 24 June 1997. See also the 
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judicial system and the rule of law in Cambodia,127 or concerns that Cambodian law is 
“confused, inconsistent, internally contradictory and full of important omissions”.128
While some commentators have a bleak prognostic, others remain hopeful that the EC 
will mete out impartial justice, and bolster and reform the local Cambodian judiciary in so 
doing.129 They point to numerous safeguards within the law that ensure international staff will 
not be railroaded by Cambodian counterparts, including the supermajority formula which 
safeguards the international judges’ decisions, and resolution mechanisms for disagreements 
between co-prosecutors and co-investigating judges.130 Beyond such arguments about the likely 
fairness of the process, supporters of the EC point to the importance of national participation and 
involvement in the trials while at the same time ensuring international standards and 
participation, and underscore the value of holding the trials in Cambodia, in Khmer, that are 
reported on local media and accessible to Cambodian people. 
3d. The Iraq Special Tribunal 
 
reports of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, in particular UN docs 
E/CN.4/1999/101 of 26 February 1999 and E/CN.4/2001/103 of 24 January 2001, and the Secretary-General’s 
Report to the General Assembly A/54/353 of 20 September 1999. 
127 See Press Release by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Judiciary on Trial, New 
York/London, 20 June 2001. 
128 Human Rights Watch, Serious Flaws: Why the UN General Assembly Should Require Changes to the Draft 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, 6 (2003), available at http://hrw.org/asia/cambodia.php  
129 Author’s interviews with members of the Royal Government of Cambodia Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force, July 
18, 2004. Moreover, the Open Society Justice Initiative, and the Cambodia Working Group that it supports, are 
engaged in work to strengthen the Tribunal that is anchored in the notion that the Tribunal can contributing 
productively justice and the development of a culture of accountability in Cambodia. Members of the International 
Working Group are associated with the following institutions: American University, Washington College of Law, 
Center for American Progress, Genocide Watch, Coalition for International Justice, Global Rights, and the ICTY. 
http://www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ij/cambodia_working_group 
130 If the co-prosecutors cannot resolve disagreements as to whether to take the case to trial or not, then five judges 
will meet to make a decision whether or not to take the case to trial.  Neither the Cambodian nor the international 
judges, co-prosecutors or investigating judges can alone block a case from going to trial. 
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Although the Bush administration has tentatively allowed for hybrid courts as viable 
alternatives to the ICC in theory,131 administration officials have rebuffed international 
involvement in efforts to establish hybrid courts in Afghanistan and Iraq, advocating domestic 
legal processes instead. “It is possible that the Bush administration ruled out hybrid trials of 
Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders not because of any anti-hybrid position per se, but rather 
because such trials might produce embarrassing reminders of past American support for his 
government and damaging evidence against Western leaders.”132 It is also possible that the Bush 
administration responded to local desires for Iraqi trials.133 For whatever reason, in crafting a 
position on trials in Iraq, the Bush administration staunchly opposed involvement by the UN or 
any other international body as such.134 The Bush administration rejected proposals by State 
Department representatives,135 and by academics and international law practitioners who 
advocated a hybrid court for Iraq and who drafted models for a mixed tribunal, which would 
 
131 Fact Sheet, Office of War Crimes Issues, May 6, 2002, http://www.state.gov/s/wci/fs/2002/9978.htm (“hybrid 
courts consisting of international participants and the affected state participants can be authorized, such as in the 
case of Sierra Leone.”) 
132 For a discussion about US resistance to a hybrid in Iraq, See Mark Matthews, Sun National, December 17, 2003, 
 http://www.sunspot.net/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.trial17dec17,0,3097763.story?coll=bal-home-headlines 
133 Author’s October 2003 interviews with Tom Parker, a former officer for M.I.5 (the British intelligence agency) 
who was the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority's crimes against humanity investigations unit, and who 
taught at Yale See also Tom Parker, Judgment at Baghdad, New York Times, July 7, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/07/opinion/07PARK.html?ex=1090250826&ei=1&en=a50f7dca15be3f71 See 
also the study conducted in Iraq by the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Center at 
the University of California, Berkeley, in July and August 2003 with 395 Iraqi men and women from a variety of 
ethnic, religious and social backgrounds exploring popular perceptions of post-Sadam justice initiatives. The study, 
Iraqi Voices: Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice and Social Reconstruction, ICTJ and the Human Rights Center, 
ICTJ Occasional Paper Series, University of California, Berkeley, available at 
http://www.ictj.org/downloads/IraqDesigned.pdf, asked respondents if they preferred local or hybrid tribunals. The 
overwhelming response was in favor of local trials.  
134 See Frank J. Murray, U.S. Will Prosecute Iraqis for War Crimes, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003. ( “On April 8, 
2003, U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Pierre Prosper and W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant to the Army's Judge 
Advocate General, announced plans for crimes against humanity trials in special Iraqi courts in what Mr. Prosper 
called ‘an Iraqi-led process that will bring justice for the years of abuses.’”) 
135 The Department of State included the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal as a component of its “Future of Iraq” 
project. This enormous project included a “‘Working Group on Transitional Justice’ consisting of 41 Iraqi expatriate 
jurists and a number of US experts. See Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice In Iraq: An Appraisal Of The “Iraq 
Special Tribunal”. (unpublished paper on file with author), at 11 
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have applied domestic and international law, with Iraqi judges and international judges drawn 
from Arab countries.136  
In September 2003, the idea of an Iraqi national Tribunal bolstered by international 
support was being actively pursued by DoD, DoS, and DoJ,  and it was coordinated by 
the National Security Council (NSC). Ultimately supported by the GC and the CPA, the 
initiative led to the drafting of the statute for the Iraq Special Tribunal, September to 
December 2003.137
 
In the end, the Iraqi Special Tribunal statute138 allows for non-Iraqi participation chosen 
by Iraqis,139 but it does not mandate that non-Iraqi participation be structured or linked with any 
kind of institution like the UN. “Pursuant to Article 6(b) of the Statute, the President of the IST is 
required to appoint non-Iraqi nationals ‘to act in advisory capacities or as observers to the Trial 
Chambers and to the Appeals Chamber.’ Article 7(n) and Article 8(j) provide for similar 
appointments with respect to Investigative Judges and Prosecutors.”140 While this may be 
perceived as offensive, and hence amended, it does provide a guarantee for international 
participation of some sort. However, given the tribunal’s enforcement of the death penalty, few 
countries with reputable judiciaries aside from the US are likely to be involved, let alone send 
staff.141 Indeed, thus far, “international” participation has been more of a euphemism for US 
involvement than anything else.  
 
136 For a discussion on drawing on judges from Arab countries with distinguished judiciaries to enhance the 
legitimacy of the proposed Iraqi court, See William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law 
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 729 [hereinafter Regionalization of International 
Criminal Law]. For a summary of a plan developed by Cherif Bassiouni for a mixed tribunal similar to the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, “that employs Iraqi judges along with experienced jurors from other Arab nations.” see 
Susan Dominus, Their Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 30, 2003, at 33.; See also Anne-Marie Slaughter & 
William Burke-White, The UN Must Help Bring Justice to Iraq, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003. 
137 See Bassiouni,  Post-Conflict Justice In Iraq, supra note 135. 
138 See The Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm 
139 Ibid., Article 6(b) of the Statute provides that “the President of the Tribunal shall be required to appoint non-Iraqi 
nationals to act in advisory capacities or as observers to the Trial Chambers and to the Appeals Chamber.” 
140 See Bassiouni,  Post-Conflict Justice In Iraq, supra note 135, at 36. 
141 TOM PARKER (Lawyer): Although the British government tried to persuade the Iraqis that the death penalty 
will make life very difficult for them; it will make it almost impossible for the international community--certainly 
for the European Union and for NGOs--to assist them, the Iraqis insisted on going forward with it” National Public 
Radio Show, All Things Considered, March 7, 2005 Monday. For a comprehensive list of those countries that apply 
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The initial steps of the court were very much marked by US involvement, as for instance 
in the case of the choreographed arraignment of Saddam Hussein on July 1, 2004. 
Although the Iraqi judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors of the IST have gradually 
taken ownership of the process, the American influence is quite visible in the supportive 
role of the RCLO, which exercises much greater influence than a mere technical support 
group, and is very engaged in almost every aspect of the tribunal’s work, from evidence 
gathering to establishing the infrastructure.142
  
The IST’s future remains uncertain at this writing, with massive political change in Iraq 
raising the question of what Iraq’s future governments will decide to do about the IST and how 
much they will challenge American ownership of the trials. Setting aside the problem of the 
United States violation of international occupation law and the fundamentally problematic nature 
of the TAL,143 the tribunal would still have to cope with the conflicts inherent in mingling an 
American-style adversarial system with an Iraqi inquisitorial one. In addition, linguistic 
problems144 appear set to plague the IST. 
4. CRITIQUES OF HYBRIDS  
All of the existing hybrids have provoked their fair share of criticisms, many of them 
justified. However, in order to improve our understanding of the structural hybrid model, it is 
critical to analyze the hybrid model’s intrinsic flaws separately from existing hybrids’ failures on 
the ground, and to explore possible solutions to these problems. 
4a. Differentiating between inherent flaws of the hybrid model and the problems of extant 
hybrids 
 
the death penalty and those that do not, see can be found on the Death Penalty Information Center website, available 
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=30&did=140  
142 See Bassiouni,  Post-Conflict Justice In Iraq, supra note 135. 
143 These problems could be partially remedied if a legitimate national legislative authority re-promulgated an 
amended law establishing a specialized criminal Tribunal in conformity with the Iraqi legal system on the basis of 
continuity of the IST. See Human Rights Workshop with Greg Fox, Wayne State University Law School, "The 
Occupation of Iraq." Yale Law School, Friday, March 4, 2005; and The Occupation of Iraq, (forthcoming, 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, March 2005).  
144 The official language of the IST is set to be Arabic, but the official, controlling version of the Statute is in 
English. Moreover, “Pursuant to Article 4 (d) of the Statute, the GC and successor may appoint foreign judges to the 
IST provided that they fulfill certain criteria which do not include familiarity with the Arabic language or the Iraqi 
legal system.”(P. 35). Bassiouni,  Post-Conflict Justice In Iraq, supra note 135. 
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Intrinsic shortcomings in the hybrid model as such should be separated out from 
predicaments that have plagued the Kosovar and East Timorese experiments. The under-funding 
and politicization in existing hybrids, and the ensuing disorganization and outreach failures, are 
tragic. However, these flaws arose from particular political circumstances145 - they hinge on 
implementation. They speak more to the specific difficulties faced by the courts in Dili and 
Kosovo than to flaws inherent in the hybrid model. Most of these hybrid courts’ problems 
stemmed from ad hoc development and under-funding in problematic circumstances rather than 
from institutional design. International donors’ reluctance to stay the course plagues all 
transitional justice drives, causing them to dilute their brand of international justice and work 
less effectively, slashing the outreach efforts so necessary to affect the local “culture of justice.” 
Not even the best strategic plan can overcome donor apathy. Had either of these hybrids received 
a fraction of the international funding and attention given to the ICTR or ICTY, the consequent 
amelioration in their work would reveal that many of their original shortcomings were not built-
in to the hybrid model per se. In this respect, the SCSL’s logistical, organizational, and financial 
success relative to the Kosovar and East Timorese models146 is revelatory.  
4b. Flaws inherent in the hybrid model 
One of the hybrid model’s worst flaws is that instead of incorporating the best of the 
international and local judicial systems, it may reflect the worst of both. Ideally, hybrids’ value 
lies in their fluidity and ability to adapt to local culture, language, and law while maintaining 
 
145 There is no guarantee that these problems will be avoided in the new hybrid emerging in Cambodia. See Seth 
Mydans’ critique of plans for a Cambodian hybrid, noting that the local “judiciary is weak, corrupt, and politically 
docile,” and this “means Prime Minister Hun Sen will be the master of ceremonies, with results that are predictable 
only to him.” Seth Mydans, Flawed Khmer Rouge Trial Better Than None. N.Y. TIMES LETTER FROM ASIA, April 
16, 2003.  
146 The Special Court for Sierra Leone experienced temporary financial difficulties with donor countries simply not 
paying promised assessments, but has succeeded in resolving this problem and obtaining the promised funds. David 
Crane, Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, “Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa’s 
Warlords,” speech at Yale Law School, April 7, 2004. 
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core values of international criminal law (which anchor them, imparting credibility and a 
measure of impartiality). However, their very capacity to adjust to local realities in an effort to 
better serve indigenous populations could be manipulated and their flexibility could morph into 
volatility and confusion. The further hybrids deviate from an international tribunal prototype, the 
more they risk being manipulated by ethnic, military, or political factions. Hybrids can still 
become kangaroo courts.  
Just as hybrids can drift too far towards the Scylla of flawed local justice, they can also 
stray towards the Charybdis of disconnected international justice. Too great a reliance on 
international structures and visions can create a chasm between the court and local populations, a 
brand of justice that smacks of imperialism and is not anchored in local culture. A promising 
model which overcomes some inherent flaws of international and local courts does not 
necessarily provide answers to all problems. Like any judicial institution, hybrids need 
leadership, independence, and funding.  
Dangers of violence and intimidation  
Hybrids share many of the problems experienced by their siblings, national courts. It can 
frequently be dangerous for war crimes trials to take place ‘in-theater’ – local and hybrid courts 
run the risk of being influenced by the very agents that perpetrated or ordered the crimes in 
question. Trying heads of state, or powerful army/paramilitary/police leaders in their former 
fiefdoms when they retain significant support bases can be enormously dangerous.147  Even 
incarcerating perpetrators might “not be feasible if their supporters retain significant military or 
paramilitary power to force their release.”  
 
147 See Nizich, Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 15. 
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With trials held locally, witness protection becomes harder to ensure, sensitive witnesses 
may well be too terrified to give testimony, and both local and international staff are vulnerable 
to attacks.148 The very real dangers of intimidation are acknowledged in the US legal system’s 
change of venue laws149 – although U.S. courts’ reluctance to countenance changes of venue 
without good reason suggests that trials can be undermined by distances between their venue and 
the location of witnesses or evidence. 
In response to the greater dangers of witness/staff intimidation in situ, hybrids can and 
should be structured to create strict firewalls between the witness protection unit and every other 
department; certain hearings can be held in camera; every precaution should be taken in hiring 
personnel with access to sensitive information, including detailed background checks; and 
adequate sums should be disbursed for the best available security technology. In extreme 
circumstances, a portion of the trials can be held outside the country.  
The potential for political manipulation of trials 
Hybrids may also flounder if the crimes they adjudicate were committed or endorsed by 
elites who were not truly ousted by the post-conflict change in regime.150 Local participation in 
hybrid tribunals can thus open the door to “sham trials by insincere regimes implicated in the 
 
148 David Crane (the Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone) and Robin Vincent (the Registrar for 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone) have received numerous death threats and appear in public only with armed 
bodyguards. 
149 28 U.S.C. 1404 (1988). Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that upon motion by the 
defendant, the court shall transfer the case to a different district if the court is satisfied that the defendant cannot 
obtain a fair and impartial trial in the district where the prosecution is pending due to prejudicial publicity. Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 21. See also Breches v. Oklahoma, 485 U.S. 909, 911-12 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that 
states have taken divergent paths when granting motions for venue change). Cases where juries were sequestered for 
security reasons include trials of mafia bosses like United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1365 (2d Cir. 1985), 
United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988), United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 929 (1993); 
United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Persico, 1994 WL 150837 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994). A case where nation-wide racial tensions raised such security issues that jurors were sequestered is the 1993 
federal trial of the police officers accused of beating Rodney King, see Stephanie Simon & Ralph Frammolino, 
Despite Perks, Sequestration is a Gilded Cage, Jurors Say, L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 1995, at A1. 
150 See Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Universal Jurisdiction in a 
Divided World, 35 NEW ENG.L. REV. 337 (Symposium) 
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very atrocities adjudicated.” On the opposite extreme of the spectrum, local input can also create 
a space for “political show trials by successor regimes bent on vengeance instead of justice” such 
that the trials “are not likely to advance the rule of law at either the national or international 
levels.”151 With severe ethnic, tribal, and political divisions among the local population, a hybrid 
court can fan flames of local strife, raising perceptions of bias or favoritism if members of one 
group are appointed over others.  
Wherever possible, constraints on local political manipulation should be implemented. 
For instance, the supermajority structure of the EC provides a reassuring bulwark/safeguard by 
ensuring that at least one international judge must join local judges in opinions regarding 
indictments, acquittals, or condemnations.  
In dire circumstances where threats of local political manipulation appear 
insurmountable, trials should be removed abroad, preferably to a neighboring country. However, 
the court should remain a hybrid court to whatever extent possible, by incorporating as much 
local staff as possible, maintaining local languages as primary languages, taking local cultural 
practices into account, and engaging intensively in outreach with affected populations. 
Logistical and personnel difficulties and the danger of corruption 
Hybrid courts face many of the logistical and training difficulties of local trials. Given 
that they hire locals and use local infrastructure, their work can be constrained by damaged 
infrastructure or a lack of experienced lawyers, judges, investigators, analysts, etc. in the 
country. These hurdles may seem daunting, but they lie at the very root of the need for hybrids. 
They speak to the desperate need to rebuild local justice systems in the wake of atrocities. 
Indeed, for hybrids to have a significant long-term impact on indigenous justice, they should be 
 
151 See Alvarez, Crimes of States, supra note 12. 
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designed with an eye to training local staff and repairing local infrastructure as much as possible. 
The more reflection on legacy-building goes into the development of hybrids, the better. 
Opening the doors to extensive local influence can crack open the floodgates of nepotism and 
corruption where local culture is riddled with such practices, as is the case in much of the world. 
Creating compensatory mechanisms, strict operating guidelines, transparency and information-
sharing systems, and external audits can stem excesses. 
Possible contradictory rulings in different hybrid courts and the ensuing  
fragmentation of international criminal law 
Another “possible dire consequence of a patchwork of hybrid courts would be a 
fragmentation of international criminal law, whereby different substantive rules emerge in 
different regions.”152 With independent hybrid tribunals adjudicating similar legal issues, but 
without any hierarchy, review procedures, principle of stare decisis, or even court-to-court-
comity, a crisis could loom with multiplying variations in the substance of international law. 
Whereas potentially dangerous splits in U.S. circuit courts of appeals on key legal issues are 
resolved by the United States Supreme Court’s writ of certiorari, which promotes uniformity, 
“the emergent system of international criminal law has neither a high court of review nor a 
requirement of stare decisis.”153 Jonathan Charney explains the danger: “Significant variations in 
general international law... could undermine the perceived uniformity and universality of 
international law.” The net result could be that “the increased multiplicity of international dispute 
 
152 Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law, supra note 136. 
153 Likewise, disagreements between the French Council d’État (the high court for administrative matters), the Cour 
de Cassation (the high court of general jurisdiction), and the Counseil Constitutionnel (which has, among other 
duties, the right of constitutional review of some laws) have proved challenging with respect to the direct application 
of European Community law in France. See, e.g., N.M. Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an 
American Perspective, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57, 65-66 (1994); see See Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law 
Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 105, 125 (1998), [hereinafter Is 
International Law Threatened] at 357. 
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settlement forums may present particular difficulties for the international legal system.”154 
Variations in substantive rules of international criminal law might create havoc155 for several 
reasons. “First, international crimes that are supposedly universal in nature would lose their 
sense of universality and global condemnation as they come to have regional variation.156 
Second, loopholes might be created whereby perpetrators of international crimes could avoid 
conviction by relying on regional variation in the definitions of crimes. Third, judges in certain 
regions could possibly reshape international criminal law to allow particular individuals to avoid 
conviction.”157 Ultimately, under the “pressure of divergent norm enunciation by different hybrid 
courts, international criminal law’s legitimacy could crumble, given the fragile nature of the 
nascent body of law.”158 Even assuming that all hybrid courts adopted a serious policy of court-
to-court comity, Charney’s concerns remain significant. This realization holds equally true for 
purely international ad hoc courts. Thomas Buergenthal, a judge on the International Court of 
Justice, notes that “the proliferation of international tribunals can… have adverse 
consequences.”159
 
154 See Charney, Is International Law Threatened, supra note 153, at 134. 
155 See Thomas Buergenthal, a judge on the International Court of Justice, observing that “the proliferation of 
international tribunals can ... have adverse consequences.” Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International 
Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 267, 272 (2001).[hereinafter Proliferation of 
International Courts] 
156 Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law, supra note 136: “Even a slight variation in 
substantive rules of international criminal law could prove extremely damaging. Take, for example, the law of 
crimes against humanity. The standard definition of crimes against humanity, as articulated by the ICTR, is any of a 
series of enumerated acts including murder conducted against a civilian population as part of a wide-spread and 
systematic attack [See Guénaël Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 237, 240 (2002). Mettraux 
notes that the core elements of the crime are (1) a widespread and systematic attack on (2) a civilian population.] 
Burke-White cautions that if a regional court redefined “widespread” or “systematic” even slightly, great variation 
in what constitutes a crime against humanity could ensue. A system might emerge in which crimes against humanity 
in Africa require a nexus to an international conflict – thereby excluding from the definition many crimes against 
humanity committed in internal conflicts, frequent in Africa.” 
157 Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law, supra note 136. 
158 See Charney, Is International Law Threatened, supra note 153, at 134. 
159 See Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts, supra note 155, at 272. 
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The issue of fragmentation of international criminal law is sufficiently important to be 
addressed and at least partially rebutted. While the threat should not be dismissed, “evidence 
from the proliferation of general international law tribunals and the nature of international 
criminal law itself suggest that serious fragmentation of substantive international criminal law is 
highly unlikely.”160 The question is not whether the proliferation of international criminal courts 
will lead to some variation in jurisprudence but rather whether tribunals are “engaged in the 
same dialectic” and “render decisions that are relatively compatible,” despite minor 
differences.161  
Jonathan Charney’s exhaustive study to determine the impact of the proliferation of 
international tribunals162 allayed fears that these courts have undermined the legitimacy of the 
international legal system. Scrutinizing the jurisprudence of more than ten international 
tribunals163 across eight substantive areas,164 Charney found that the various tribunals “share a 
coherent understanding of that law,”165 and differ remarkably little in substantive international 
law. Charney concludes that “the variations among tribunals deciding questions of international 
law are not so significant that they challenge its coherence and legitimacy as a system of law.”166
Based on his interviews with actors in various international tribunals, 167 Burke-White 
finds that other courts’ “deference to the ICTY has effectively created a system whereby ICTY 
 
160 Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law, supra note 136. 
161 See Charney, Is International Law Threatened, supra note 153, at 137. 
162 For instance, the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, ICJ, WTO, ECJ, numerous international arbitral bodies, and hybrid courts in 
Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone. 
163 These include, among others, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, the ICJ, the GATT/WTO 
Tribunals, and various arbitral bodies. See generally See Charney, Is International Law Threatened, supra note 153. 
164 Ibid., These include sources of law, the law of state responsibility, and the law of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. 
165 Ibid., at 347. 
166 Ibid., at 371. 
167 Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law, supra note 136. Burke-White Interview with 
Sylver Ntukamazina, Judge, in Dili, East Timor (Jan. 19, 2002): Judge Sylver Ntukamazina in the UNTAET Special 
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decisions have a quasi-stare decisis effect, thus helping to ensure uniformity of the international 
legal system.” He believes that similarly, “a great deal of deference… to the decisions of the ICC 
can be expected.”168  
Indeed, minor variation in jurisprudence will not threaten coherence and compatibility, 
and may in fact allow for experimentation that will help develop the best international law. This 
idea is reminiscent of Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel's argument for “democratic 
experimentalism.”169  
Moreover, the proliferation of hybrid criminal courts may be a means of preventing the 
dangers of substantive fragmentation of international criminal law that would ensue if countless 
national courts developed separate jurisprudence. In his analysis of international tribunals’ 
jurisprudence on crimes against humanity, Guenael Mettraux observes: "Whereas national courts 
sometimes relied upon distinctively domestic definitions of [crimes against humanity,]” 
international tribunals provide “a welcome degree of jurisprudential uniformity.”170
Ultimately, we live in an imperfect world, a world of second bests. Hybrids will never be 
perfect instruments of justice, but their flaws can be mitigated and they can provide desperately 
needed solutions to crises on the ground. 
5. WHY HYBRIDS AND NOT INTERNATIONAL AD HOC TRIBUNALS:  
In considering hybrid courts as a potential replacement for international ad-hoc tribunals, 
we must explore the flaws of a model of purely international justice. This entails examining the 
major shortcomings of existing ad-hocs with a focus on defects that hybrids can remedy.  
 
Crimes Unit, in Dili, East Timor frequently relies on the ICTY and ICTR. See also Burke-White Interview with 
Stuart Alford, UNTAET Special Crimes Unit Prosecutor, in Dili, East Timor (Jan. 14, 2002): Stuart Alford also 
consults the Rome Statute, the ICC Preparatory Commission materials, and ICTY and ICTR judgments. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 
323 (1998). 
170 See Mettraux, The Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals, supra note 156, at 238. 
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5a. Shortcomings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Established in 1994 in the wake of the Rwandan genocide,171 the ICTR has suffered from 
major operational problems, low morale, administrative incompetence and mishandling of funds. 
“Regrettably, the ICTR’s beginnings were fraught with mismanagement and minor corruption. 
Because of the ‘closed society’ mentality of the UN system and its aversion to admit error, the 
cover-up lasted for almost two years, until the Inspector General produced a scathing report.”172 
Indeed, “allegations of incompetence” have continually “dogged the Rwanda court.”173 
Linguistic difficulties abounded, since translations were often haphazard and occasionally non-
existent. Moreover, the ICTR has “been tainted by charges of racism…and the revelation that 
four genocide suspects were working on defense teams.”174 Critics also argue the court is too 
slow.175  
Partly because of its inefficiency, corruption, and costliness, but also due to its culturally 
and physically inaccessible nature, the ICTR has massively failed in its outreach and public 
relations to Rwandans. Those genocide survivors ICTR purports to serve have generally felt the 
court to be alien, unsupportive, or even offensive. Rwanda scholar and Human Rights Watch 
Rwanda researcher Alison Des Forges who worked extensively with the ICTR told journalists 
 
171 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., 
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
172 In February 1997, a U.N. investigative panel released a report concluding that the ICTR had been plagued with 
bureaucratic waste and mismanagement since its establishment in 1994. See e.g. Report of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services on the Audit and Investigation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, U.N. Doc. A/51/789 
(1997) ; see also Cherif Bassiouni, The Institute for Global Legal Studies Inaugural Colloquium: The UN and the 
Protection of Human Rights: Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 35. 
173 See England, UN Tribunal Struggles to Be Model of International Justice, supra note 32. 
174 Ibid.  
175 Despite the fact that most of the key suspected architects of the genocide are in custody, the ICTR has only 
delivered 15 judgements involving 21 accused people, convicting 18 of them and acquitting three others, leaving 
dozens of detainees on or awaiting trial. (The ICTR's 2001 report to the Security Council projected 136 new accused 
by 2005, which would have kept the court trying cases for more than 150 years at its rate of completion). See 
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that the ICTR is still out of touch with the average person in Rwanda. “Most Rwandans know 
very little about the tribunal,” she said, noting “that the tribunal’s information center in the 
capital Kigali - complete with computers - can provide little help to most victims and surviving 
families.” She pointed out that “some 90 percent of Rwanda’s 8.5 million people are peasants, 
most of whom live without electricity.”176 Pernille Ironside, a specialist on the gacaca system,177 
also concluded that most Rwandans “know little of trials in Arusha except that the ICTR…is a 
foreign and removed body alien in procedure, whose slow pace of trials is proof of UN 
inefficiency, or worse, indifference to Rwandan needs.” She found in her research that 
“skepticism has evolved into anger with the hypocrisy that those most culpable are subjected to 
the best and most fair processes,” which culminate in their serving their “terms in ‘luxurious’ 
Western prisons and, in any event, to avoiding the death penalty.”178 The International Crisis 
Group concurs that that “the survivors of the genocide find the tribunal distant and indifferent to 
their lot.” Indeed, many “witnesses refused to testify after a genocide survivors’ group known as 
IBUKA criticized the tribunal and suspended cooperation with it.”179 Moreover, “the victims of 
the crimes of the RPF denounce it as an instrument of the Kigali regime, seeing the ICTR as a 
symbol of victor’s justice.”180
The Rwandan government – perhaps the ICTR’s most powerful potential partner in 
breaking Rwanda’s culture of impunity, reestablishing the rule of law, and engaging in mass 
education – has been alienated and even enraged by the tribunal, much like the aforementioned 
 
176 See England, UN Tribunal Struggles to Be Model of International Justice, supra note 32.  
177 Gacaca courts are a civil dispute resolution process, based on a traditional form or Rwandan justice, meaning 
literally “judgment on the grass,” whereby elders in traditional Rwandan society used to bring together victims and 
accused of a given crime to try and achieve reconciliation. Patrick Fullerton, Trying Genocide Through Gacaca, 
http://www.gjp.ubc.ca/_media/srch/030613genocide_through_gacaca.pdf 
178 See Pernille Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca: Seeking Alternative Means to Justice, Peace and Reconciliation 15 N.Y. 
INT'L L. REV. 31. [hereinafter Rwandan Gacaca] 
179 Ibid. 




Hybrids: the Future of International Accountability and Criminal Prosecutions 
 
                                                
genocide survivors. From the moment the UN drafted the ICTR statute, the Rwandan 
government protested181 and expressed its reservations.182 Irate that the seat of the ICTR was to 
be in Arusha, Tanzania, the Rwandan government argued that it ought to be located in Rwanda 
in order for the tribunal to better achieve accountability and national reconciliation.183 During a 
brief period in November 1999, relations with the ICTR deteriorated to the point where “Rwanda 
severed diplomatic relations with the ICTR, after the appeals chamber ordered the release of 
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a director in the Foreign Ministry and the head of the radio station 
responsible for hate propaganda, because of procedural violations.”184 Although the severance of 
diplomatic relations between the ICTR and Rwanda was later formally repaired, very little 
cooperation exists in fact.  
Both the Rwandan government’s support for gacaca and its decision to pass the Organic 
Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or 
Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990,185 signal just how little the ICTR 
 
181 For information on the joint tribunal on Rwandan soil originally sought by Rwanda's post-genocide government, 
See Alvarez, Crimes of States, supra note 12. See also Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and 
Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in 
Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. Int'l L.J. 163. 
182 For information on the Rwandan government’s position, see See Alvarez, Crimes of States, supra note 12; see 
also S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (1994) (citing S/1994/1115 (1994)) 
Situation Concerning Rwanda. In mid-1994 the new Rwandan government that came to power in the wake of the 
1994 genocide (then a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council) sought international assistance in 
prosecuting the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. It proposed establishment of an international tribunal. However, 
the Rwandan government wanted the tribunal’s jurisdiction to extend to the full range of offenses committed by the 
prior Hutu regime, including acts of incitement that preceded the great wave of killings from April -July 1994. This 
was rejected since broader jurisdiction for the ICTR could have led to inquiries that would have embarrassed either 
the U.N. and particular permanent members of the Security Council. The Rwandan government also wanted to limit 
the jurisdiction to offenses committed through mid-July 1994 – namely, prior to the new government's assuming 
power. In addition, it hoped that international assistance would take the form of joint trials and investigations, or at 
least international proceedings within Rwanda. The Rwandan government thus cast the sole vote within the Security 
Council against establishing the ICTR.  
183 See Situation Concerning Rwanda, supra note 182 (statement of Manzi Bakuramutsa, representative of Rwanda). 
184 See J. Coll Metcalfe, Rwanda Normalizes Relations with UN Tribunal, INTERNEWS, Feb. 10, 2000, available at 
http://www.internews.org/PROJECTS/ICTSnewsFeb00.html#feb17   
185 This law was enacted on September 1, 1996 by the Rwandan government to deal with the approximately 90,000 
detainees then awaiting trial in Rwandan prisons. 
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has been able to improve law-making and judicial institutions on the ground in Rwanda.186 With 
over 800 employees and a budget of around 90 million US dollars, the ICTR diverted enormous 
resources that could have been used to rebuild parts of Rwanda’s shattered judiciary.  
Rwanda has been burdened with 130 000 prisoners in its jails, and the domestic genocide 
trials cleared an estimated 5,000 cases from their dockets between 1996 and 2002,187 a speed that 
was achieved at the expense of due process guarantees to the accused. Recognizing that “even if 
this pace were maintained, it would still take upwards of 120 years to prosecute the estimated 
110,000 to 130,000 alleged génocidaires…held in overcrowded prisons.”188 Rwanda has now 
turned to gacaca, a model of justice even further from international standards. The desperation 
motivating the Rwandan government’s justice initiatives contrasts with the ICTR’s snail’s 
pace,189 which fails even to give victims the satisfaction of swift, impartial justice being meted 
out to top perpetrators.  
 
186 For a representative example of international lawyers’ emphasis on the shortcomings of Rwanda's administration 
of the Organic Law, See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner & Jason S Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law 190-201 (2d ed. 2001)., at 154-56; see also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting 
Genocide in Rwanda III (1997) available at http://www.lchr.org/pubs/rwanda.htm, at VIII. 
187 See Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca, supra note 178; See also Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Elections May Speed 
Genocide Trials, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/rwanda1004.htm; UN Integrated Regional 
Information Network (IRIN) Rwanda: September Returns Bring Year's Tally to 17,000, AFR. NEWS, Oct. 23, 2000; 
see also Susan Cook & George Chigas, Putting the Khmer Rouge on Trial, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 31, 1999, at 1 
(illustrating the lack of a legal infrastructure in the Rwandan courts).  
188 See Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca, supra note 178; See also Human Rights Watch, Report on Rwanda: Justice and 
Responsibility (1999) at 11, 15-16, available at www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-05.htm; Dana 
Harman, Rwanda Turns to its Past for Justice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 30, 2002, at 9 (opining that it will 
take 200 years to try some 135,000 suspects in custody); see also Ed O'Laughlin, Worn Down by Horrors of War, 
the Children of Rwanda's Exodus Head Home to Face New Peril: No Turning Back for Red Cross Orphans, 
INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 27, 1997, at 19 (adding that thousands of children are also being held in the 
overcrowded Rwandan jails). 
189 See Marks, Justice Delayed, supra note 180. “Seven years after its establishment immediately following the 
genocide in Rwanda, and more than four years since the beginning of the first trial, the...ICTR…[had]…handed 
down verdicts on only nine individuals…Between July 1999 and October 2000, the only substantial case heard was 
the trial of a single accused, Ignace Bagilishema… Five judges out of nine have spent more than a year and a half 
without hearing a substantial case and one of them had managed by last March to attain a record 28 months without 
hearing a substantial matter…” 
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In sum, the ICTR’s inability to connect to local populations or with the local judicial 
system has major consequences for its ability to fulfill its broader moral mandates of fostering 
the rule of law and cultivating accountability. 190
5b. Shortcomings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia   
Most commentators agree that the ICTY suffered from few of the ICTR’s problems 
relating to corruption and racism, despite some instances of slowness, mismanagement and 
incompetence.191 However, many of the ICTR’s difficulties arising from remoteness – cultural, 
linguistic, and physical – surface in the ICTY.  
Some observers believe that the ICTY’s actions are actually counterproductive because 
the indictments have hardened Serbs’ opposition to the peace treaty. Most Bosnian Serbs 
complain that the tribunal is biased because it has selectively prosecuted more Serbs than 
Croats or Moslems, even though atrocities were committed by all sides…Many Moslems, 
meanwhile, argue that indictments of Moslems have been undertaken simply to counter 
Serbs’ bias charges. Regardless of the reasons, both Serbs and Moslems have so far been 
reluctant to hand over indicted suspects. 192
 
The work of the court has often been misunderstood within all ethnic groups, but Serb 
populations across all of the former Yugoslavia have been particularly unsupportive, typically 
 
190 Ibid, It has done even less to promote national reconciliation or establish a neutral historical record about various 
aspects of the genocide. “[S]even years on, it has still not been able to shed light on the design, mechanisms, 
chronology, organisation and financing of the genocide, nor has it answered the key question: who committed the 
genocide?...The symbolic existence of the tribunal has also not… dissuaded the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide 
and the war between the former Rwandan government of Habyarimana and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The 
perpetrators of the genocide have rearmed with complete impunity in the refugee camps of eastern Congo, leading to 
the resumption of the war by the RPF in 1996 and again 1998 on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
where war crimes and crimes against humanity continue to be committed by both sides. It is certainly not the 
responsibility of the judges of the ICTR to write history. But their failure to complete the central tasks of delivering 
justice and establishing a record of events also prevents them from contributing to another mandate set by the 
Security Council: national reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi communities.”  
191 See David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 865 
(Symposium “The ICTY At Ten: A Critical Assessment Of The Major Rulings Of The International Criminal 
Tribunal Over The Past Decade”). Mr. Tolbert's article offers a unique insider’s perspective on (1) problems relating 
to the choice and qualifications of counsel; (2) the severe lack of training of defense counsel; (3) serious concerns 
arising from the payment of counsel, including so-called “fee-splitting”; (4) questions relating to discipline; and (5) 
the establishment of an effective bar association for defense counsel. Mr. Tolbert cautions that “real and serious 
issues relating to defense counsel remain.” See also., Lucas W. Andrews, Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a Failure of Jurisprudential Theory, 11 EMORY INT'L 
L. REV. 471 (1997). 
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considering the ICTY a Western imposition and hence tainted by imperialism. 193 The ICTY’s 
failure to publicize its work within Bosnia, particularly within the legal community, and the 
absence of local actors, even as observers, makes the ICTY’s already unfamiliar common-law 
approach to criminal justice even more alien to the local legal profession. A recent empirical 
study elucidates perceptions of lawyers and judges from all ethnic groups within Bosnia/ 
Herzegovina. The study indicates that most were ill-informed about the ICTY and often 
suspicious of its motives and its results.194  
According to Bogdan Ivanisevic of Human Rights Watch, “Untruthful and inaccurate 
reporting about the ICTY’s work” largely lies behind “the prevailing negative attitude of the 
Serbian public toward the Hague tribunal.” Influential “reporters and analysts in Serbia who 
strongly dislike the Tribunal present flagrant untruths about factual and legal aspects of its 
work…in the most prominent media in Serbia,” with a disastrous and “decisive impact on public 
opinion.” The media thus “cements the widely-shared hostility against the ICTY among Serbian 
society.”195 Unfortunately, the fact that biased reporting fuels local distrust and resentment only 
compounds the fact that the tribunal has not conducted successful outreach.  
Serbs are not alone in their opposition to the ICTY. “Even a cursory reading of 
newspapers and policy journals in Croatia reveals growing antagonism felt for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague (ICTY) by Croatia’s public 
opinion.”196 Beyond such impressionistic data, “an August 2000 survey in Croatia…found a high 
percentage of Croatians believed that The Hague is biased, while fifty-two percent ‘believed that 
 
193 See The Berkeley Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, Joint Study, supra note 
80. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Bogdan Ivanisevic, The Grapes of Wrath, DANAS, May 7 2004, available at 
 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/07/serbia8573.htm  
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'The Hague wants to criminalize the Homeland War.’ Not surprisingly seventy-eight percent felt 
that Croatia should not ‘extradite its citizens if the Hague Tribunal requests it.’”197  
Ivana Nizich of Human Rights Watch argues that “few in the former Yugoslavia believe 
that the ICTY is going to prosecute those that deserve prosecution, that it will establish the truth 
of what happened during the war, or that it will serve as a vehicle or impetus for reconciliation 
among the various peoples of the former Yugoslavia.”  Nizich adds that “even proponents of the 
ICTY in the former Yugoslavia are disillusioned by its performance,” and more worrisome, “the 
people of the former Yugoslavia view the ICTY as an amorphous body in the Hague that was 
created by the international community to ameliorate [sic] its own guilt…it is ‘someone else’s’ 
tribunal…Its inability to act as a vehicle for reconciliation or to be respected in the Balkans is 
due, in large part, to its lack of outreach to the peoples of the region.”198  
The Registrar’s Office staffs someone to engage in outreach in one or two locations in the 
Balkans (in Zagreb or parts of Bosnia), but they usually limit themselves to “disseminating 
general information about the Tribunal.” The Rules of the Road program was the only effort 
made to share the tribunal’s expertise with domestic authorities in the former Yugoslavia, and 
remained an unsystematic contribution.199
More importantly, “the Office of the Prosecutor has made little effort to communicate 
with the public of the former Yugoslav countries despite the fact that one of its primary goals is 
 
197 Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law, supra note 136, citing Survey Shows 'Anti-Hague 
Atmosphere' Increasing In Croatia, FBIS Doc. EUP20000823000244 (Aug. 19, 2000) (trans. of Jutarnji List 
(Zagreb), at 31)). 
198 See Nizich, Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 15. 
199 For assessments of the Rules of the Road program, see High Representative develops strategy for ‘Rules of the 
Road’ Court proceedings, Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative, Thursday, November 
08, 2001, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=6292; and OSCE Mission to Bosnia and 
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to provide justice to the victims of the region.” 200 Indeed, a survey conducted with a 
representative sample of Bosnian judges and prosecutors with primary or appellate jurisdiction 
for national war crimes trials found that even these critical actors in the local justice system had 
limited or no access to legal publications from or about the ICTY.201 This sense of being 
marginalized or ignored by distant foreigners led local legal professionals to perceive the court 
negatively. “A universal criticism of the ICTY by legal professionals was that they perceived 
their sporadic contact with the Tribunal as a sign of disrespect.”202 Most participants believed 
that it was precisely the international nature of the ICTY which gave rise to certain problems, 
and commented “that international representatives frequently were unfamiliar with the Bosnian 
legal system and acted arbitrarily to impose external rule on the country and its legal 
institutions.” Average citizens with less legal expertise and fewer resources at their disposal are 
even less likely to be well-informed about the ICTY and its activities or to feel that they are part 
of a consultative, respectful process (though this may in part be a commentary on the inherently 
perpetrator-centric nature of legal trials, as opposed to victim-centric processes like Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions). 
The failure to impact key populations on the ground in post-conflict former Yugoslavia is 
more troubling than the ICTY’s weak enforcement powers or its slow progress in starting trials. 
The ICTY’s inability to foster a culture of accountability and justice can largely be ascribed to its 
limited impact on local populations.  
In an effort to “assess its potential legacy” David Tolbert, now Executive Director of 
ABA-CEELI and former Chef de Cabinet to the President of the ICTY and Senior Legal Adviser 
 
200 See Nizich, Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 15. 
201See The Berkeley Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, Joint Study, supra note 
80. 
202 See Nizich, Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 15. 
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to the Registrar of the Tribunal, argues that the ICTY did not “serv[e] as an important tool of 
[local] legal development and as a catalyst for local war crime prosecutions.”203 He points out 
that “the tribunal will apparently fold its operations without contributing much to either the 
justice systems in the region or the prosecution of war crimes” although “those who created the 
ICTY Statute …should have foreseen …that the bulk of war crimes prosecutions would occur in 
local courts.”204  These observations are critical, for they highlight the difference between 
accountability for perpetrators of past abuses, and the creation of a culture of justice: although 
the ICTY prosecuted war criminals, it has not noticeably fostered the rule of law or respect for 
international human rights law in the former Yugoslavia.  
The ICTY had neither the mandate nor the resources to actively assist in improving the 
domestic justice systems or assisting in local war crimes prosecutions. These design failures 
mean that the tribunal’s long-term impact on justice systems in the former Yugoslavia has been 
minimal, even in cases dealing with the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity – 
the pillars of its subject matter jurisdiction. Sadly, despite millions of dollars spent on building a 
judicial infrastructure in The Hague, there is little effective enforcement of these important laws 
in the region's domestic courts, which remain ill-equipped to provide fair, impartial trials for all 
ethnic groups, especially in the explosive war crimes context.205 This lack of accountability can 
only detract from efforts to rebuild peace, security, and the rule of law in the region. The failure 
to bolster local courts for war crimes prosecutions is all the more troubling given the millions 
 
203 David Tolbert, The Evolving Architecture of International Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7. 
204 Ibid. Tolbert also points out “It is only fair to note that most of the responsibility for these shortcomings lies not 
with tribunal officials” but with those who drafted the ICTY statute. Tribunal officials “could hardly be expected to 
take on these tasks as they are outside the tribunal's mandate.” 
205 The UN has only just advanced a plan to establish a court that will actually be located in Bosnia and will employ 
local people. This is the Sarajevo War Crimes Chamber and was announced in a Statement made by Judge Theodor 
Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security 
Council on Oct. 9, 2003, available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/news_archive/03/03Oct/ICTY_101003b.htm. For a 
thoughtful critique of the SWCC, see Ellis, Serbia’s New Court, supra note 13 
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that have been pumped into the ICTY, and the relatively low cost of training local 
prosecutors/judges, monitoring court proceedings involving war crimes issues, and contributing 
technical expertise.  
In conclusion, ad hoc’s inability to improve domestic legal systems and their 
unpopularity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia raises questions as to whether their primary 
purpose is in fact to bolster the rule of law on the ground and create a sense of justice being 
done, or instead to create international legal precedent, establish a historical record, letting the 
international community to expiate its guilt.  
5c. Financial burden of wholly international tribunals 
Some commentators have noted higher degrees of UN involvement in an 
internationalized court make it easier to secure a sustainable source of funds.206 This refers 
specifically to courts like the ICTY and ICTR, with budgets derived from assessed contributions 
from member states. While it is undeniably harder to obtain funding for a court that depends on 
voluntary contributions, as is the case with the Sierra Leone court, hybrid courts (which are more 
distant from the UN and often rely on voluntary contributions) are also substantially less 
expensive than wholly international courts. The higher the degree of UN involvement in an 
internationalized court, the more money the court will need.207  
Expenditures for the ICTR from 1995-2003 totaled approximately $410 million, “which 
computes to $8 million per indictment and $45.5 million per conviction.” The budget for the 
ICTY in the same period reached approximately $471 million, “an average of $5.5 million per 
 
206 Webb, Six Degrees of Separation, supra note 11. 
207 Even judges at the ICTY and ICTR have been criticized the high costs of such tribunals. Patricia Wald, the 
former U.S. judge at the ICTY has observed that the “United Nations is understandably anxious to bring to closure 
the ICTY and the tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which together consume almost ten percent of the total UN budget.” 
See Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence: The Use of Affidavit Testimony in 
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 535, 536 (2001). 
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indictment and $22.5 million per conviction.”208 Comparing these expenditures to the $2 million 
average cost per capital case in the United States, “it is thus twenty times more expensive to 
prosecute (but not incarcerate) a genocidal perpetrator in the ICTR, and ten times more 
expensive in the ICTY, than it is to convict and execute a murderer in the United States.”209 
Ultimately, in the past eight years, the U.N. Security Council “has paid some $1.6 billion… to 
operate International Criminal Tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.”210
Most professional staff at the ICTY and ICTR are at the P-2, P-3 and P-4 levels, while 
judges are at the D-1 level. Individuals in the P-3 or P-4 bracket earn in the U.S.$60-80,000 
range.211 A hybrid court might need to pay some salaries in the $60-100,000 range to attract 
some necessary international staff, but most salaries could be far lower. If calculated to reflect 
local costs of living, salaries could still provide substantial advantages for local employees over 
the domestic job market, thus reducing what is usually a court’s largest single cost. 
The costs of UN tribunals are also largely inflated by the need for multiple translations. 
For instance, a substantial portion of the ICTY budget covers translation costs, with more than 
170 employees in the Language Services Section.212 Hybrid courts can be structured to achieve 
significant savings by minimizing the working languages of the court, thus reducing the number 
of translators needed.  
The cost of collection and production of evidence in hybrid courts can be reduced as well, 
through lower travel costs and potentially greater cooperation with national authorities.  
 
208 Ibid, Annex IX., The estimated appropriation for the ICTY for 2002-2003 is just over U.S.$256 million. 
209 George Yacoubian, S., Jr., Evaluating the efficacy of the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia: implications for criminology and international criminal law. WORLD AFFAIRS, WNTR, 2003. 
[hereinafter Evaluating the efficacy of the international criminal tribunals] 
210 See Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap, supra note 61. 
211 See United Nations Salaries, Allowances, Benefits and Job Classification, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm  
212 See Yacoubian, Evaluating the efficacy of the international criminal tribunals, supra note 209. 
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The lower costs of regional criminal justice become particularly apparent when 
comparing international tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR with hybrids. The Sierra Leone 
hybrid was substantially cheaper than the ICTs, with its $19 million first-year budget roughly 
equal to one-fifth of the ICTR’s current annual budget. Its total budget for three years is 
estimated to be around $75 million.213 Admittedly, the inadequate sum spent on the East Timor 
hybrid led to numerous failings (The 2001 budget of the East Timor hybrid was a mere U.S.$6.3 
million, with approximately U.S.$6 million spent on prosecution and U.S.$300,000 dedicated to 
the operation of the court itself).214 However, the striking difference in cost between a 
supranational enforcement mechanism such as the ICTY and the Sierra Leone Special Court is 
strong evidence of the financial savings which may be offered by regional international criminal 
law enforcement without compromising the quality of the court. Such savings could easily 
translate into greater political willingness of states to support international criminal law, as the 
oft-stated fears of unchecked expenses are allayed. 
Financial problems contribute significantly to ad hoc tribunals’ obstacles in establishing 
local legitimacy. Their cost compounds the problems of the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals’ 
un-popularity with the very populations they purport to serve,215 and their failure to strengthen a 
local culture of justice.  
These critiques of the ad hoc tribunals are by no means intended as blanket 
condemnations of the institutions as such – volumes would be required to adequately explore all 
 
213 Richard Dowden, Justice Goes on Trial in Sierra Leone, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 3, 2002. 
214 See Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap, supra note 61, at 5.
215 See Marks, Justice Delayed, supra note 180, “For the majority of Rwandans, the ICTR is a useless institution, an 
expedient mechanism for the international community to absolve itself of its responsibilities for the genocide and its 
tolerance of the crimes of the RPF.” See also Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca, supra note 178: “The ICTR was hastily 
established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the autumn of 1994, at least in part, to assuage the 
guilt felt by Western leaders for not having intervened to stop the genocide and to avoid appearing as favoring the 
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the nuances and arguments on both sides of the debate. Indeed, the ICTY and ICTR’s 
jurisprudence contributes markedly to the important development and expansion of international 
humanitarian law, setting valuable precedent. The ICTY and ICTR must be admired for serving a 
norm-enunciating function and bolstering international legal and human rights discourse 
worldwide. This paper cannot address such critical issues in detail, and limits its focus to the ad 
hoc tribunals’ ability, or lack thereof, to communicate with and positively impact local 
populations and local institutions.  
Hypothetically, ad hoc tribunals could improve their outreach efforts to the point where 
they were able to mobilize significant popular support and reinforce local judiciaries. An 
empirical study which surveyed local perceptions of how the ICTY could foster justice, 
accountability and reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia advocates that the ICTY “pursue the 
option of conducting ICTY trials on the territory of BiH supported by a rigorous protection 
program for witnesses, judges and legal professionals” and “amplify the ICTY outreach 
program.”216 Enhancing ad hoc tribunals’ public relations departments could obviate some of the 
most important justifications for hybrids. However, international tribunals would hardly be able 
to engage in meaningful, sweeping outreach and work with domestic judiciaries without 
significant local input, or without embracing some fusion of local and international influences, 
and hence edging towards a more hybrid structure. 
6. HOW HYBRID COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
CAN COEXIST 
The ICC’s establishment has already had a significant impact on the world of 
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crimes cases. This is where hybrid courts come in. Indeed, the potential for ICC-hybrid 
symbiosis speaks to the heart of hybrids’ importance. Hybrids will neither undermine the ICC 
nor be rendered superfluous by the ICC.  
6a. The ICC does not render hybrids superfluous  
The establishment of the ICC by no means lessens the need for hybrid courts.217 Even 
those who would wish to see the ICC supplant other international criminal tribunals eventually 
must admit, however grudgingly, that they are necessary in the short run because of the ICC’s 
statutory limitations. Pursuant to Article 11 of the ICC Statute, the ICC will have jurisdiction 
only with respect to crimes committed after the treaty comes into force. Consequently, the world 
faces a judicial vacuum over violations of international humanitarian law in the period prior to 
the ICC’s establishment, or in countries that are not signatories. 
The ICC’s very statute218 recognizes the value of local prosecutions, since the ICC gives 
preference to bona fide domestic procedures. The Statute recognizes the primacy of national 
courts, as is evidenced by the stated principles that the ICC shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions.219 “The concept of complementarity is fundamental to the design of the 
ICC Statute: if in a case otherwise eligible for consideration by the ICC a bona fide examination 
 
217 Hybrid courts would not strip the ICC of jurisdiction because of the complementarity regime and so would not 
endanger the effective deployment of the ICC. (1) First, the existence of hybrid panels might render the domestic 
court system capable of handling some cases but not others (lower level subordinates, but not leaders most 
responsible for mass atrocities). The Kosovo hybrid is a likely model of coexistence with international tribunals. (2) 
Second, a state that does not wish to prosecute a given case and would prefer ICC involvement might well be 
deemed "unwilling" to prosecute, and could choose to leave some cases for the international forum to resolve, even 
if a hybrid court existed. (3) Third, the ICC jurisdictional test could be applied based on the capacity of the domestic 
court system prior to international involvement. Even if a hybrid court had been established, the ICC could still 
inquire as to whether the domestic court system (not the hybrid court) was willing and able to prosecute. 
218 See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9*, 
corrected Nov. 10, 1998, and July 12, 1999, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html, reprinted in 37 ILM 
999 (1998) (uncorrected version) [hereinafter ICC Statute].  
219 See Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complementarity: the International Criminal Court and National 
Prosecutions, A View From Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 201. [hereinafter Beyond Complementarity] 
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of the alleged crime was undertaken and disposed of by a state (whether or not it is a party to the 
ICC Statute), the matter will not be admissible before the ICC.”220
Despite their seductively high profile, prosecutions at the ICC are only one option in the 
accountability arsenal, and must be considered in light of other courts’ capacity to handle a 
greater caseload. Even in the best of all possible worlds, the ICC will only be able to judge an 
infinitesimal fraction of human rights abusers in any given situation The ICC’s particular ability 
to handle explosive trials of top perpetrators begs the question of what forum other, lower-profile 
cases can be litigated in. In this respect, hybrid mechanisms should be seen as a useful 
complement to ICC. Brian Concannon of the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (International 
Lawyers’ Office) in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, argues that “in fact, it is highly likely that in any 
circumstance in which the ICC assumes jurisdiction, the number of cases crying out for some 
form of international adjudication…will vastly exceed the ICC’s capacity. Yet it is precisely in 
these circumstances that huge numbers of cases cannot be adequately resolved by local courts… 
Complementarity and the Statute’s provisions for assistance to local judiciaries are not 
enough.”221 If prosecution of those responsible for large scale human rights abuses is to be the 
rule rather than the exception, then international assistance must be systematically integrated 
with local judiciaries to form some type of hybrid mechanism.222
The non-conflictual relationship between the Kosovo hybrid courts and the ICTY 
demonstrates that hybrids need not replace international justice (or local justice, for that matter).  
6b. Hybrids do not mitigate the need for the ICC 
 
220 See Jonathan I. Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Courts, 95 A.J.I.L. 120. 
221 Ibid.  
222 For a discussion on Haiti's experience in coming to terms with the human rights violations of its 1991-94 
dictatorship as a point of departure for discussing why the Court should support local prosecutions and how it could 
do so, see Concannon, Beyond Complementarity, supra note 219. 
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From a pure legalistic perspective, hybrid courts will not strip the ICC of jurisdiction 
because of the complementarity regime. More broadly speaking, hybrid courts would not 
undermine the ICC’s utility even if they successfully tried high-ranking war criminals.  
First, in response to the ICC’s complementarity principle, which deprives the court of 
jurisdiction unless domestic courts are “unwilling” or “unable” to prosecute a given case, a 
hybrid court is not truly part of the domestic court system. By definition, it is a mixed 
domestic/international court. Second, the existence of hybrid panels might enable the domestic 
court system to handle some cases but not others (trials of lower level subordinates, but not top 
leaders). Third, a state that does not wish to prosecute a given case and would prefer ICC 
involvement could choose to leave a case for the international forum to resolve, despite the 
existence of a hybrid court. 
Beyond potential coexistence of ICC and hybrids in related cases involving the same set 
of mass atrocities, situations might emerge where donors would not step up to the plate and 
finance a hybrid tribunal. In this context, the ICC stands as an insurance policy against fickle, 
arbitrary world politics which give Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia their own dedicated 
tribunals, but leave states further down the political priorities totem pole like the Sudan or 
Chechnya suffering atrocities without the hope of any international justice. To some extent, the 
ICC can provide an effective, independent and universal process for critical cases in situations 
where the UN lacks political will to establish a hybrid, or where local actors oppose the creation 
of a hybrid.  
Even in situations where post-conflict states and influential superpowers converge in 
their willingness to prosecute top perpetrators for ordering or endorsing atrocities, the dangers 
prosecuting the most powerful war criminals can sometimes make it irresponsible to call for 
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local/hybrid prosecution. The ICC will be in a position to prosecute high profile, politically 
explosive cases in a way that local or even hybrid courts could not, given the unbearable 
pressures they might face.  
6c. Problematic ICC connection with local populations creates a need for hybrids 
The ICC will face linguistic and cultural obstacles in reaching out to local audiences, and 
may well rely on symbioses with entities better able to connect better to local populations. The 
ICC Statute places an emphasis on outreach, for instance in its provision for the possibility of the 
Court sitting regionally. Although the ICC’s seat is in The Hague, Article 3 of the Rome Statute 
allows for the ICC to move to another seat in certain circumstances – presumably to the country 
or region where the atrocities took place.223  However, even if decision-makers within the ICC 
have learned a lesson about the importance of outreach from the failures of ad hoc tribunals, all 
fears cannot be laid to rest. From the perspective of most people in post-atrocity countries, the 
ICC will probably remain mysterious: staffed by foreigners, working in a distant land, in 
languages that few understand, applying previously unheard-of laws. Notwithstanding provisions 
in the ICC Statute on stronger victim participation and Prosecutor Ocampo’s stated commitment 
to communicate with concerned populations,224 the ICC could appear even more like a deus ex 
machina than the ad hoc tribunals, yet further removed from local realities. 225  
 
223 Pursuant to Article 3, “[t]he seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague in the Netherlands,” but “[t]he 
Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable.” ICC Statute, supra note 218, arts. 3(1), 3(3). 
224 See Luis Moreno Ocampo, Prosecutor International Criminal Court, address at Yale Law School, March 26, 
2004. 
225 See Nizich, Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 15. “In most places around the world, the United 
Nations…internationals who are sent to an area to help the local population, are perceived as arrogant, ignorant and 
imperialist. In many instances these perceptions are unjustified or instigated by governments or quasi-governmental 
entities or rebel groups in a given area. However, it is also a sad fact that many internationals are disdainful or 
ignorant of the culture, history and sufferings of the local population they are supposedly there to protect or for 
whom they are purportedly working to provide justice.”  
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Given the importance of reaching out broadly in post-atrocity states in order to create a 
culture of accountability and respect for human rights, the ICC can only be a part of a puzzle – 
we cannot expect it to provide an entire solution.  
CONCLUSION   
Ad hoc tribunals’ days appear to be numbered. The ICTY and ICTR’s inherent 
weaknesses and donor fatigue make it too late for them to reform and demonstrate a capacity for 
improved communication with local populations. The ICTY and ICTR are being forced to speed 
up in anticipation of closing shop in 2008,226 with the Bush administration “seeking a firm 
timetable for shutting down United Nations war-crimes tribunals, saying they have been marred 
by instances of mismanagement and abuse that ‘challenge the integrity of the process.’”227 The 
clock is thus ticking all the more urgently to find viable alternatives to ad hoc tribunals. 
With ad hoc tribunals fading from the scene, many national courts unable to cope alone 
with serious large-scale atrocities, and the ICC limited in its resources. In this context, hybrid 
courts must seriously be considered as a promising new form of transitional justice, especially 
when successfully linked to broader justice reform initiatives.  
Despite the dangers of integrating local elements with international justice, and of 
divergences between hybrids in their interpretation of international law, the benefits of 
abandoning a cookie-cutter/one-size-fits-all approach to trying war crimes outweigh the 
disadvantages. If the hybrid model can be implemented with adequate funding and management, 
with a mandate broadened to include spurring on local justice reform via CLE, mentoring, or 
trial observer programs, to name but a few mechanisms, it can contribute to an effective and 
 
226 See Jan Repa, US wants no permanent tribunals. BBC NEWS. Friday, 1 March, 2002. “The American 
ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, Pierre-Richard Prosper told a congressional hearing that The Hague 
tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda should be wound up by 2008. Mr. Prosper… suggested that in many 
cases war-crimes suspects could be tried by local courts.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1849094.stm
227 See Jess Bravin, Bush Presses for Closing of Tribunals. WALL ST. JOURNAL, February 28, 2002  
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integrated international justice system and hold perpetrators of gross violations accountable for 
their crimes. Equipping national justice systems to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide can establish a global system for accountability, strengthening 
the capacity of local legal systems to deliver justice.  
Justice resides not only in material acts, such as holding specific perpetrators 
accountable, but also in perceptions, and in creating the rule of law. In order for international 
justice to flourish and endure, accountability must be accepted by local populations in post 
atrocity areas and integrated into local consciousness and culture. In establishing a culture of 
justice, communication with victims, perpetrators, and onlookers is paramount. While hybrid 
courts do not automatically ensure good communication with local populations, their very 
structure helps to reach out to locals. Hybrid courts offer a potentially powerful blend of 
international legitimacy and local understanding – a learning process for national and 
international lawyers working in them, and all the people they come into contact with, in ever 
widening ripples of interactions.  
International legal scholars increasingly endorse values of local ownership in transitional 
justice processes, and questions about courts which blend international and national elements 
should thus be moving to the forefront of academic and practitioner debates. Academics and 
practitioners advocating accountability for war criminals must strive harder to understand and 
adapt to the idiosyncratic conditions of each different post-atrocity country. “International law 
and fora should mediate, but not dictate, the forms of criminal accountability.”228 In our search 
for mechanisms to break cycles of impunity and provide victims with a sense that justice has 
been done, we should focus on the promise of hybrids. Only when they responsibly articulate 
 
228 See Alvarez, Crimes of States, supra note 12. 
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detailed and sensitive studies of hybrid courts can these war crimes tribunals live up to their full 
potential. 
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